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Abstract
We consider a secondary spectrum market where primaries set prices for their unused channels. The pay-off
of a primary then depends on the availability of channels for its competitors, which a primary might not have
information about. We study a model where a primary can acquire this competitor’s channel state information
(C-CSI) at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries, where each primary decides whether to acquire
the C-CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. We first characterize the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this
game for a symmetric model where the C-CSI is perfect. We show that the payoff of a primary is independent of
the C-CSI acquisition cost. We then generalize our analysis to allow for imperfect estimation and cases where the
two primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel availabilities. Our results show interestingly that the
payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. We also show that surprisingly, the expected payoff
of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI acquisition cost decreases or primaries have different availabilities.
Index Terms
Nash Equilibrium, Secondary Spectrum Access, Channel State estimation, Price Competition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum sharing where license holders (primaries) allow unlicensed users (secondaries) to use their
channels can enhance the efficiency of the spectrum usage. However, secondary access will only proliferate
when it is rendered profitable to the primaries. We investigate a secondary spectrum market where there
are competing primaries that want to lease their unused channels to secondaries in lieu of financial
remuneration. In our setting, primaries can be wireless service providers or any other intermittent users of
the spectrum (e.g. government agencies, TV broadcasters) or the infrastructure (e.g. access point owners)
and secondaries can also be service providers or individual users. We assume the market operates in fixed
time intervals. At the start of each interval, the primaries announce prices for their channels if they are
available1. Each secondary seeks to buy an available channel with the lowest price.
The availability of a channel varies randomly because of the usage statistic of a primary, e.g if a primary
need to use a channel to serve its own traffic, the channel will be unavailable for sale2. When its channel
∗ The authors are with Electrical and Systems Engineering Dept., University of Pennsylvania, USA; Their E-mail Ids are:
arnob@seas.upenn.edu, swati@seas.upenn.edu† The author is with Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department of Northwestern University, USA; The e-mail Id
is:rberry@ece.northwestern.edu
1The time-scale at which this market operates could range from seconds to hours depending on the underlying technology. The key
assumption being that if a primary puts its channel up for sale, it commits to allowing the secondary to use that channel for the next interval.
2Availability could also depend on channel fading or interference levels over the time-scale at which the market operates.
TABLE I: Frequently used Notations
Notation Significance
v The highest price that a secondary is willing to pay for an available channel.
qi Availability probability of primary i.
q In the basic model q1 = q2.
si The C-CSI acquisition cost for primary i.
s In the basic model s1 = s2 = s.
qs The C-CSI estimation accuracy.
c The transaction cost which the primary incurs only when it sells its channel.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
2.
01
15
4v
3 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
2 O
ct 
20
16
2is available, the profit or payoff that a primary can obtain will depend in part on the availability of the
channels of other primaries in the market.
We consider a scenario where the primary can estimate the competitor’s channel state information
(C-CSI) by incurring a cost. This C-CSI provides an estimate of the competitor’s channel state (CCS),
which indicates if it is available for sale or not. The motivation behind considering such a scenario is the
growing interest in incorporating spectrum measurements into various approaches for dynamic spectrum
access. For example, a recent proposal is made by FCC to sense the occupancy of the 3.5 GHz band
by environmental sensing capability (ESC) operators (e.g. Google, KeyBridge) [1]. The cost to acquire
the C-CSI can be incurred in several ways. For example, i) the primary could need to devote resources
throughout the location to sense the competitor’s channel and estimate its traffic patterns; this could cost
the primary in terms of power consumption or processing resources. ii) Alternatively, the primary could
incentivize users to collaboratively crowdsource such measurements using their own wireless devices (see
e.g. [2], [3]). Here the cost to the primary is the payments to incentivize participation. iii) Finally, these
estimates could be performed by a ‘third party’ that deploys a network of wireless spectrum sensors as
in [4]3 and uses these to sell “forecast” of the CCS to a primary. Additionally, there may be errors in
this estimation due to traffic variability, noise and hidden terminal effects. Characterizing how the C-CSI
costs and errors impact the competition between the primaries is the goal of this paper.
We now illustrate the challenges involved in analyzing this setting. A primary with an available channel
needs to select whether to acquire the C-CSI and the price for its channel. However, while taking its own
decision, a primary does not know whether its competitors decided to acquire the C-CSI or not. The
importance of C-CSI is immense. For example, if the competitors’ channels are not available, a primary
can sell its channel at the highest possible price due to a lack of competition. This suggests that a primary
would want to acquire C-CSI. However, if the other primaries are available, the primary may have to
select lower price because of the competition. This lower price may not be enough to cover the C-CSI
acquisition cost. Hence, it is not a priori clear whether primaries will acquire the C-CSI.
The inherent uncertainty in the competitors’ decisions also complicates the pricing strategy of a primary.
We now illustrate this when there are two primaries. If one primary (A) knows that the channel of the
other primary (B) is available, A’s pricing decision depends on if B also knows A’s availability or not,
as this will in turn impact the competition it faces. On the other hand, if primary A does not know B’s
channel state, then it must balance between selecting a lower price, which will increase its probability of
selling should the competitor be present, and a higher price, which will give it more revenue should B
be absent.
To address these issues, we focus on a market with two primaries (though some extensions to more
primaries are addressed in Section VII). The restriction to two primaries is mainly done to simplify our
analysis:- however, there are practical situations where this is a reasonable assumption4 We study a non-
cooperative game with the primaries as players. When its channel is available, each primary decides i)
whether to acquire the C-CSI or not, and ii) a price. If the primary acquires the C-CSI, it may select
different prices depending its estimate of the CCS. When the primary does not acquire the C-CSI, it has
to select a price irrespective of the CCS. We characterize the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies.
Basic Model: We first consider a basic model (Section ??) where the acquired C-CSI is equal to CCS.
The channel availability probability and the C-CSI acquisition costs are the same for both the primaries.
We introduce a [T, p] class of strategies (Definition 4) and show that the NE strategy profile is of this form.
In a [T, p] strategy, a primary acquires the C-CSI, when the cost is below T with probability (w.p.) p, and
does not acquire the C-CSI, otherwise. We allow the primaries to potentially randomize their prices given
the C-CSI acquired. Using this characterization, several interesting properties of the NE are then shown.
First, p is increasing as the C-CSI cost decreases, but a primary never acquires C-CSI w.p.1. Second, T
increases in the uncertainty of the CCS. Third, we have the following counter-intuitive result: the ability
3Another example of such a 3rd party sensing network is the ESC operators (e.g. Google, KeyBridge) in the 3.5 GHz as mentioned before.
4For example, if the primaries are wireless service providers, then in many places this market is dominated by only two such providers.
Hence, wireless market with two players have been considered in [5]–[8].
3to acquire C-CSI does not impact the expected payoff of a primary. Finally, we show that the equilibrium
pricing strategy is indeed to randomize and we characterize the resulting price distributions.
Impact of the Estimation Error: We, subsequently, investigate the impact of C-CSI errors on the decision,
payoff and the pricing strategy of a primary (Section IV). Conventional wisdom might suggest that errors
in estimating the CCS should decrease the payoff. However, this is not definite because errors might also
make primaries less aggressive in lowering their prices to compete against competitors when they acquire
C-CSI, which could lead to higher profits. Interestingly, we show that this is indeed the case, i.e., the
primary’s pay-off is higher with C-CSI errors.
We show that there again exists a [T, p] type NE strategy, where the threshold T decreases as the
estimation error increases. Intuitively, increases in the error in estimating the CCS makes the acquisition
of the C-CSI less attractive for larger costs. The probability p again increases as the C-CSI cost decreases,
but now the expected pay-off of a primary also increases.
The NE pricing strategies are again randomized. In the basic model, when the primary accurately
estimates that the competitor’s channel is unavailable, it selects the highest possible price v w.p. 1.
However, when there are errors in C-CSI, the competitor’s channel may be available even when it estimates
that it is not. Thus, a primary also selects a lower price.
Impact of Unequal C-CSI acquisition costs: We also investigate the setting where C-CSI acquisition
costs may differ across the primaries (Section V). We show that [T, pi] strategies are NE for primary i.
Each primary has the same threshold T but different probabilities pi, where pi is larger for the primary
with the lower cost. The expected payoff of the primary with a higher cost is the same as it would have
obtained if there was no provision of acquiring the C-CSI. In contrast to the basic model, the expected
payoff of the primary with a lower cost is higher compared to the other primary.
The primaries again randomize their prices, where the primary with a lower cost chooses its price from
a larger range when it acquires the C-CSI (and a smaller range when it does not). In contrast to the basic
model, the primary with a higher acquisition cost also has a point mass at the highest price in the price
distribution when it does not acquire the C-CSI, i.e., the primary with a higher acquisition cost selects
higher prices with higher probabilities when it does not acquire the C-CSI.
Impact of heterogeneous availabilities: We next consider the impact of different availability probabilities
across the primaries (Section VI). Again, we show that the NE strategy is of the form [T, p]. In this case,
the primary with a higher availability has a higher threshold and a higher probability of acquiring the
C-CSI. The expected pay-off of the primary with a higher availability is greater, and interestingly, the
expected pay-off of the other primary decreases as the cost for acquiring the C-CSI decreases which
negates the conventional wisdom that the payoff of a primary should not decrease as the cost of acquiring
the C-CSI decreases. We also show that the pricing strategy of each primary is randomized over a given
interval. However, the primary which has a higher availability probability selects a price from a larger
(smaller, resp.) interval when it acquires (does not acquire, resp.) the C-CSI.
Related Literature: Price selection in oligopolies has been extensively investigated in economics (dating
back to the classic work of Bertrand [9]) as well as in the wireless setting. For wireless applications, we
divide the entire genre of works in two parts: i) Papers in which prices are set via an auction (e.g. [10],
[11]), and ii) Papers, such as ours, which model price competition as a non co-operative game ( [12]–
[32]). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to include the option of acquiring the C-CSI
in the strategy space of the players. Additionally, compared to the first category of papers, our model
is readily scalable and a central auctioneer is not required. Most of the papers in the second category
considered that the primary is aware of the competitor’s channel state, which is also the case in the classic
Bertrand model [9]. The exceptions are some recent papers [26]–[28], [30], [33] which considered that
the primaries can not acquire the C-CSI, so that each primary selects its price not knowing the CCS5.
In contrast, we consider that primaries have the option of acquiring the C-CSI. A primary now needs to
5 [30] considered that each player has private information such as capacity which is unknown to the competitor. Thus, this setting is
equivalent to the setting where a primary can not know the channel availability of its competitor.
4judiciously decide whether to acquire the C-CSI and selects a price based on the result of this decision.
In our setting, a primary (A, say) is also unaware whether the other primary has acquired the CSI of A,
while in [26]–[28], [30], [33] the primary A knows that its channel state is unknown to other primaries.
Naturally, these papers did not consider the impact of the C-CSI acquisition costs, estimation error and
different channel availability probabilities.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a secondary spectrum market with two primaries (players) and one secondary6. We first
provide the basic system model in Section II-A and subsequently, we specify certain generalizations of
the model in Section II-B. Commonly used notations are given in Table I.
A. Basic Model
We consider a model in which spectrum leases occur over a sequence of fixed time-slots and focus
on one such time-slot7. The duration of a time-slot could range from minutes to hours depending on the
underlying technologies and other considerations (e.g., the overhead in running the market). Here the main
consideration is that if a primary announces a price for its channel, it commits to allowing secondary
usage of the channel for the next time-slot. The availability of a primary’s channel for sale will depend in
part on the primary’s own traffic. We define a channel to be in state 1 if it is available and otherwise, it
is in state 0. 8 Each primary’s channel is available w.p. q, where 1 > q > 0 and q is common knowledge.
If C-CSI is not acquired, a primary is unaware of the realized state of its competitor.9
If a primary’s channel is available, the primary can sell it for secondary use during the next time slot.
In this case, it decides whether to acquire the C-CSI before deciding the price for its available channel.
For example, if the market opens at time t, then at time t− δ, a primary decides whether to acquire the
C-CSI or not. By acquiring the C-CSI, a primary obtains an estimate of the competitor’s channel state
(CCS) for the entire duration of the slot. The C-CSI estimation is accurate and thus, a primary knows the
exact CCS. The primary incurs a cost s if it estimates the C-CSI.10
Each primary then decides its price and posts it to the secondary at the beginning of the slot.11 If
the channels of both the primaries are available for sale, then, the secondary will buy the lower priced
channel. If the two available channels have the same price, then a secondary will choose either of them
w.p. 1/2.
B. Generalization of the Model
1) Estimation Error: When a primary acquires the C-CSI, it estimates the CCS for the entire slot
duration. Because of the channel fading, noise in the environment, the random variation of the usage
pattern of the channel, that estimation may be erroneous. In Section IV, we consider such a setting where
the estimated CCS is accurate only with probability qs. Specifically, if a primary acquires the C-CSI, then,
6If there are more than one secondary, then the decision of the primary is trivial, it will always sell its channel, thus, it will select the
highest possible price and will never acquire the CSI. Our model can also accommodate the setting where the number of secondaries is not
known a priori.
7Of course, in practice primaries and secondaries may take a longer term view, requiring a dynamic game model, but we leave such
considerations for future work.
8Availability could also depend on the rate available to a secondary being large enough, which in turn might depend on estimates of fading
and interference levels over the next time-slot. These can also be viewed as part of the CCS, though in such cases a better model might be
to allow for the state of the channel to vary with the rate as in [27], [33] (see also Sect. VII).
9In other words, this is viewed a Bayesian game in which the type of a primary is its channel state, and q is the belief that each primary
has about the type of its competitor, where here all beliefs are consistent and reflect the true type distribution.
10Note that a primary (specially, if it is a wireless service provider) may already have some knowledge of its competitor (especially
long-scale trends obtained via market research). However, in our scenario the primary needs to estimate the CCS on a smaller time scale
(i.e., the slot duration at which the market operates). This short time-scale CCS is not readily available to operators. Hence, the primary
needs to incur a separate cost to acquire the C-CSI.
11Note that if the channel of a primary is unavailable, then the secondary will never buy the channel irrespective of its price
5it will estimate that the CCS is 1 (0, resp.) w.p. qs if the original CCS is 1 (0, resp.). Without loss of
generality, we assume that12 1/2 < qs ≤ 1. Note that when qs = 1, there is no estimation error and a
primary accurately estimates the CCS, thus, the basic system model is a special case of this model.
2) Different Costs of Acquiring the C-CSI: In Section V we generalize the basic model to allow each
primary i to incur a different cost, si for acquiring the C-CSI.
3) Different Channel Availability Probabilities: We generalize the basic model in Section VI by
allowing each primary i to have different availabilities qi.
C. Payoff of a primary
If primary i sets its price at x and it decides to acquire the C-CSI, then, its payoff is{
x− c− si, if the primary is able to sell its channel,
−si, otherwise.
Note that when both the primaries incur the same cost to acquire the C-CSI, then we have si = s.
When a primary does not acquire the C-CSI, then its payoff at price x is{
x− c, if the primary is able to sell its channel,
0, otherwise.
D. Strategy of a Primary
If the channel of a primary is available13, it will take a decision D ∈ {Y,N} where Y denotes incurring
the cost s to estimate the C-CSI and N denotes not acquiring the C-CSI. Primary i also sets a price for its
available channel. Note that the primaries’ decisions are simultaneous so that no primary is aware of the
decision of its competitor when making its own decision. If a primary selects Y , it selects a price using
either a distribution F1(·) or F0(·) depending on whether it estimates the CCS as 1 or 0, respectively.
If a primary selects N , then it does not acquire the C-CSI, so it only selects its price using a single
distribution F (·).
Definition 1. The strategy Si of primary i = 1, 2 is σ(D,F) where F = (F0, F1) when D = Y , F = (F, F )
when D = N , and σ(D,F) is a probability mass function over the strategies (D,F).
The strategy of the primary other than i is denoted as S−i.
Definition 2. E{ui(Si, S−i)} denotes the expected payoff of primary i when its channel is available, it
uses strategy Si and the other primary uses strategy14 S−i.
E. Solution Concept
We consider a non-cooperative game where each primary only wants to maximize its own expected
payoff. We use the (Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept.
Definition 3. A Nash equilibrium (NE) (S1, S2) is a strategy profile such that no primary can improve its
expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from its strategy15 [34]. Thus,
E{ui(Si, S−i)} ≥ E{ui(S˜i, S−i)} ∀ S˜i. (1)
12If qs = 1/2, then there is no point of estimating the CCS as the setting becomes equivalent to the setting where a primary does not
know the channel state of its competitor.
13If the channel of the primary is unavailable, then its decision is immaterial.
14Note that we consider the expected payoff of a primary as the expected payoff conditioned on the channel of the primary being available.
Naturally if the channel of the primary is unavailable, it will attain a payoff of 0 and so its unconditional expected payoff is simply this
quantity scaled by qi.
15In the language of Bayesian games, the expectation here is with respect to a player’s belief about the availability of the competitor’s
channel (which as we have noted can be viewed as the competitor’s type). The belief about the competitor’s type (i.e. availability) also
changes depending on the information the primary has. Given the consistent belief assumption, we simply refer to the resulting Bayesian
Nash equilibrium as a NE in the following.
6A strategy profile is symmetric if Si = Sj for any pair of players i and j.
III. RESULTS OF THE BASIC MODEL
We, first, investigate the system model depicted in Section II-A. Note that this setting is a special case
of each of the more generalized settings depicted in Sections II-B1,II-B2, and II-B3.
A. Goals
Acquiring the CSI of the competitor has potential advantages. For example, if a primary knows that
the channel of its competitor is unavailable, then, the primary can select a high price because of the lack
of competition. However, a primary has to incur a cost to acquire the CSI. Thus, conventional wisdom
suggests that as the cost of acquiring the CSI decreases, a primary should more frequently acquire the CSI
and thereby gain a higher payoff in an NE. However, conventional wisdom is not definitive because of
the following. The payoff of a primary (1, say) also inherently depends on the decision of other primary
(2,say). If the primary 2 decides to acquire the CSI of primary 1, then primary 2 selects a lower price
when the channel of primary 1 is available, thus, in response16, the primary 1 also selects a lower price in
the NE which reduces its payoff. On the other hand, acquiring the CSI of the competitor is also not ruled
out either. This is because a primary may acquire the CSI of its competitor and take advantage of the
extra information. Thus, it is not apriori clear whether a primary will acquire the CSI of its competitor.
It is also not clear even if a primary decides to acquire the CSI at what values of s it will do so. We
resolve all the above quandaries.
The inherent uncertainty in the competitor’s decision also complicates the pricing strategy of the primary.
If primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available, its pricing decision still depends on if primary
2 also know that its channel is available; if not then the primary 2 may randomize among multiple prices,
enabling primary 1 to charge a higher price. If primary 2 knows that the channel of primary 1 is available,
primary 2 selects a lower price, in response primary 1 also selects a lower price. On the other hand, if
the primary does not know the channel state of its competitor, then it may have to randomize over prices
from an interval which is not known apriori. Thus, it is also not apriori clear how a primary will select
its price. We also characterize NE pricing strategies.
B. Results
1) A class of Strategy for selecting Y : We first define a class of strategies for selecting Y .
Definition 4. A [T, p] strategy is a strategy where a primary selects{
Y, w.p. p when s < T
N, w.p. 1 when s ≥ T
for 0 < p ≤ 1. The probability p may be a function of s.
We show that in the basic model as well as in different generalizations, the NE strategy is a [T, p] strategy
where p is a strictly decreasing function of s. We also characterize T , and p in different generalizations
of the basic model.
It is intuitive that in an NE, a primary will choose Y with a probability p = f(s) where f(·) is a
decreasing function. It is also intuitive that f(s) = 0 when s > (v − c) as the maximum expected payoff
that a primary attains is v − c. We, however, show that f(s) can be 0 even for smaller values of s. We
also show that p never becomes 1 for any positive value of s. We fully characterize the function f(·) and
the value of the threshold T above which a primary does not select Y .
16In an NE, each player selects a best response strategy in response of the strategy of the other player.
72) Main Results: Our main results are–
• Regardless of the cost s, there is no NE where both the players have full knowledge of each other’s
channel states w.p. 1 (Theorem 1). There is no NE where one primary has the complete knowledge
of the channel state of its competitor, but the other does not (Theorem 2). Thus, a primary can only
select Y , if the other primary randomizes between Y and N .
• We show that the unique NE strategy is a [T, p] strategy where T = q(v − c)(1 − q) (Theorems 3
and 4). Note that T increases when the uncertainty of the availability of the channel increases i.e. q
becomes closer to 1/2. Intuitively, when either q is large or small, the uncertainty of the competitor’s
channel decreases, thus, a primary selects N for higher values of s. We also characterize the value
of p as a function of s and show that p is a decreasing function of s.
• The expected payoff that a primary attains in any NE strategy profile is (v − c)(1− q) (Theorems 3
and 4). Thus, the expected payoff of a primary is independent of the value of s. [26] shows that
when a primary can not acquire the CSI of the competitor, then its payoff is (v− c)(1− q). Thus, the
provision of acquiring the CSI of the competitor does not impact the expected payoff of a primary.
• Theorem 3 shows that when each primary selects N , then each primary randomizes its price from
the interval [p˜, v]. Theorem 4 shows that when a primary selects Y (N , resp.) and the channel of
its competitor is available, then the primary selects its price from the interval [p˜1, p˜2] ([p˜2, v],resp.).
Intuitively, as the uncertainty of the availability of the competitors increases, a primary selects a
higher price. We also show that p˜ < p˜1. Thus, a primary selects its price from a larger interval when
it randomizes between Y and N .
We now describe the results in details. We first state some price distributions φ(·) and ψ(·) which we use
throughout.
φ(x) =0 if x < p˜
1
q
(
1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c
)
if p˜ ≤ x ≤ v
1 if x > v. (2)
ψ(x) =0 if x < p˜
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c ) if p˜ ≤ x < v
1− q, if x = v
1 if x > v. (3)
where p˜ = (v − c)(1− q) + c. (4)
C. Does there exist an NE where both primaries select Y ?
Theorem 1. There is no Nash equilibrium where both the primaries choose Y w.p. 1.
Outline of the proof : Assume both players choose Y , so that they know each other’s channel state.
Thus, the competition becomes similar to Bertrand Competition [34], i.e. if the channel of its competitor
is unavailable, then the primary will set its price at the v, otherwise it will set its price at the lowest value
c. Now, the probability with which the channel of a primary is available is q. Thus, the expected payoff
of a player is
(v − c− s)(1− q) + (c− c− s)q (5)
Now consider the following unilateral deviation for a primary: Primary 1 selects N and sets its price at v
w.p. 1. The channel of primary 1 will be bought when the channel of primary 2 is not available for sale.
Since primary 1 decides not to incur the cost s, thus, its expected payoff is
(v − c)(1− q) (6)
8This is strictly higher than (5). Hence, the strategy profile can not be an NE.
The above theorem means that there will be at least one primary which will be unaware of its
competitor’s channel state with a non-zero probability.
D. Does there exist an NE where one selects Y and the other selects N?
Theorem 2. For positive s > 0, there is no NE where a primary selects Y w.p. 1 and the other selects
N w.p. 1.
First, we provide the intuition behind the result. The primary (say, 1) which selects Y tends to select
lower prices with higher probability when it knows that the channel of the other primary is available.
Thus, in response the primary 2 (which selects N ) selects higher prices with higher probabilities in order
to gain a high payoff in the event that the channel of primary 1 is unavailable since it knows that its
probability of selling is very low in the event that the channel of primary 1 is available. The primary 1
can then gain a higher payoff by selecting N and higher prices as it does not have to incur the cost s.
Hence, the primary 1 has an incentive to deviate from its own strategy. The detailed proof is given below.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that primary 1 selects Y and primary 2 selects N . First,
we discuss the pricing strategies of primaries 1 and 2 and calculate the expected payoff of primary 1,
subsequently, we show that primary 1 has an incentive to deviate.
When primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is not available, then primary 1 will be able to
sell its channel at the highest possible price, thus, it will select v w.p. 1 and its payoff if (v− c)− s. The
above event occurs w.p. 1− q.
Now, we consider the case when the channel of primary 2 is available. While deciding its price, primary
2 only knows that the channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q. However, while selecting its price primary 2
knows that the primary 1 will know the channel state of primary 2 if the channel of primary 1 is available.
Hence, when primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available, then the pricing decision becomes
equivalent to the setting where primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available w.p. 1 and
primary 2 knows that the channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q. The NE pricing strategy in the last
setting has been studied in [26] and using Theorem 2 in [26] we have
Lemma 1. Primary 1 must select its price according to φ(·) (given in (2)) and primary 2 must select its
price according to ψ(·) (given in (3)).
By Lemma 1 when the channel of primary 2 is available for sale, then expected payoff of primary 1
at any p˜ ≤ x < v
(x− c)(1− ψ(x))− s = (v − c)(1− q)− s. (7)
At x < p˜, the payoff of primary will be strictly less than the expression in (7). On the other hand at v,
primary 1 will get strictly a lower payoff compared to the payoff at a price just below v since ψ(·) has
a jump at v. Hence, the maximum expected payoff to primary 1 in this case is (v − c)(1− q)− s.
Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s. (8)
Now, we show that if primary 1 selects N , then the primary can achieve strictly higher payoff. For
x ∈ [p˜, v), the expected payoff of primary 1 at N is
(x− c)(1− qψ(x)) = (x− c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q) (9)
Thus, for every positive s there exists a small enough  > 0 such that at x = (v − c − ), it will attain
strictly higher payoff than (8). Hence, if primary 1 selects N and the price v −  w.p. 1 then primary 1
attains a strictly higher payoff. The result follows.
9E. Does there exist an NE where both primaries select N?
Theorem 3. Suppose that each primary selects the strategy (N, φ) (φ(·) is given in (2)). The above
strategy profile is the unique NE when s ≥ q(v − c)(1− q).
However, the above is not an NE when s < q(v − c)(1− q).
We provide an intuition behind the result. When s is high, if a primary selects Y , then it has to incur
high cost compared to the potential gain it will achieve, thus, no primary has any incentive to deviate.
When s is low, if a primary deviates and selects Y , then it can gain higher payoff by taking advantage of
the CSI of the other primary. Thus, the strategy profile fails to be an NE when s is low. We prove that
the strategy profile is an NE in Theorem 5. We show the uniqueness in Appendix.
Remark: The result shows that when the cost s is high, in an equilibrium both the primaries select N .
It is obvious that if s > (v− c), then a primary will never opt for Y . The above theorem shows that even
if s ≥ (v − c)q(1− q), primaries will select N .
F. Does there exist an NE when s is low?
Note from Theorems 1, 2 and 3 that if s is low, then there is no NE strategy where each primary selects
either Y or N w.p. 1. Thus, at least one primary must randomize between Y and N when s is low.
Now, consider the following price distributions
ψ1(x) =

0, if x < p˜1,
1
p
(1− p˜1 − c
x− c ) if p˜1 ≤ x ≤ p˜2,
1, if x > p˜2.
and
ψ2(x) =

0, if x < p˜2
1
q(1− p)(1−
(v − c)(1− q)
x− c − qp) if p˜2 ≤ x ≤ v
1, if x > v
where p˜1 and p˜2 are
p˜1 =
(v − c)(1− q)(1− p)
1− qp + c, p˜2 =
(v − c)(1− q)
1− qp + c (10)
Note that both ψ1(·) and ψ2(·) are continuous. In the following, we show that a strategy profile based on
these distribution is a NE when s is small enough.
Theorem 4. Consider the following strategy profile: Each primary selects Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1 − p
where p =
q(v − c)(1− q)− s
q(v − c)(1− q)− sq . When choosing Y , the primary selects its price according to ψ1(·) when
it knows that the channel state of the other primary is available, otherwise it selects v w.p. 1. When
choosing N , the primary selects price according to ψ2(·).
The above strategy profile is the unique NE if s < q(v − c)(1 − q). The expected payoff that a primary
attains in the NE strategy profile is (v − c)(1− q).
The proof of the strategy profile is an NE is similar to the Theorem ?? where we consider the CCS
estimation may not be accurate. We prove the uniqueness in the Appendix.
Example 1. We illustrate the computation of the NE streategy for an example where v = 50, c = 0, s = 8,
and q = 0.5. Since s < q(v − c)(1− q), the NE strategy is given by Theorem 4 which gives p = 0.5294.
Using p, the strategies ψ1(·) and ψ2(·) are readily obtained and shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 1: Variation of p as a function
of s in an example setting: v =
11, c = 1, q = 0.5. When s ≥ 2.5,
p = 0. p→ 1 as s→ 0.
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Fig. 2: Variation of p as a func-
tion of q in an example setting:
v = 11, c = 1, s = 2. When either
q ≤ 0.28 or q ≥ 0.72, p = 0. p is
maximized at q∗ = 0.55, maximum
value of p is 0.35.
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Fig. 3: The pricing strategies ψ1(·) and ψ2(·) in
the scenario described in Example 1. The support
of ψ1(·) and ψ2(·) are respectively [16, 34] and
[34, 50].
Discussion: Note from the above theorem that when s is low there exists an NE where both the primaries
randomize between Y and N . It is also easy to discern that as s decreases, p increases and as s → 0,
p→ 1 (Fig. 1). Thus, when the cost of obtaining the competitor’s CSI decreases, then the primaries will
be more likely to acquire that information.
Note that q(1 − q) is the measure of uncertainty, if the uncertainty if higher (i.e. q = 1/2), then the
threshold is also higher. A primary never selects Y if s ≥ (v−c)/4. By differentiating, it is easy to discern
that when s < (v − c)/4, then p is maximized at q∗ = 1 −√s/(v − c) (Fig. 2). Since s < (v − c)/4,
q∗ > 1/2. Note also that q∗ decreases as s increases. Intuitively, when s increases, primaries tend to select
Y only when the uncertainty of the availability of channel increases.
The support set of ψ1(·) is [p˜1, p˜2] and ψ2(·) is [p˜2, v]. Thus, under Y a primary selects lower prices
when the primary knows that the channel of its competitor is available compared to the setting where
the primary is not aware of the channel state of its competitor. This is because in the former case the
uncertainty of the appearance of the competitor is reduced.
Since p increases as s decreases, thus, from (10), p˜1 increases as s decreases. Thus, a primary selects
its price from a larger interval when s decreases. Also note that p˜2 also increases as s decreases. Thus,
the support set of ψ1(·) increases as s decreases.
Theorems 3 and 4 imply that the expected payoff of a primary is (v − c)(1 − q). Note that when the
primaries always know each other’s channel states, the competition becomes equivalent to the Bertrand
competition [34] and the expected payoff is 17 (v − c)(1− q) and when the primaries are constrained to
select only N , the expected payoff is again (v−c)(1−q) [26], [27]. Hence, our result also builds the bridge
between the two extremes. Specifically, it shows that the cost s or the availability of the competitor’s CSI
does not impact the expected payoff.
G. Welfare of the Secondaries
Fig. 4 shows the variation of the expected price paid by the secondary. Initially, the expected price
decreases as the C-CSI acquisition cost s increases. The expected price reaches the minimum value, and
then increases with the increase in s. When s ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q) i.e. the primaries select N w.p. 1, the
expected price is the same in the setting with s = 0 i.e. when the primaries select Y w.p. 1. Fig. 4 shows
that the expected price paid by the secondary is minimum at a positive cost; the minimum is not attained
when s = 0 which negates the conventional wisdom. Note that the expected payoffs of the primaries are
independent of the cost s. Thus, the expected social welfare which is the sum of the expected payoffs
17It can also be obtained from (5).
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Fig. 4: Mean price paid by the secondary
of the primaries and the expected utility of the secondary (which is the negative of the price paid by the
secondary) is in fact minimum at s = 0.
IV. IMPACT OF ERROR IN THE ESTIMATION
We, now, investigate the impact of the estimation error. Towards this end, we consider the system model
specified in Section II-B1. Specifically, if a primary estimates the CSI of its competitor, the estimation is
accurate only with probability qs (1/2 < qs ≤ 1).
A. Goals
The impact of error in the estimation on the decision and the payoff of each primary is not apriori clear.
The conventional wisdom suggests that the error in the estimation should decrease the payoff. However,
the conventional wisdom is not definitive because of the following. If there is an error in estimating the
channel state of the competitor, then, the primary 2 selects a higher price even when it estimates that the
channel state of the primary 1 is 1, thus, in response, the primary 1 selects a higher price without reducing
the winning probability, which may increase the payoff. It also remains to be seen whether the expected
payoff of a primary is independent of s like in the basic model. Even if the selection of Y belongs to the
class [T, p] (Recall Definition 4), the dependence of T and p on the estimation error is also not apriori
clear.
The pricing strategy also depends on the estimation error. For example, when the estimation error is 0,
then a primary selects a high price when the estimated channel state of the competitor is 0 as the channel
of the competitor is unavailable. However, when there is an error in estimated channel state, the actual
channel state may not be 0 even when the estimated channel state is 0. Thus, a higher price may reduce
the probability of winning and a lower price may reduce payoff in the event of a selling. Our goal is to
characterize the pricing strategies of the primaries.
B. Main Results
We now summarize our main findings in this section here–
• We show that the NE strategy is a [T, p] strategy (Definition 4) with T = q(2qs − 1)(v − c)(1 − q)
(Theorems 5, 6). Note that in the basic model, we have also seen [T, p] type strategy for selecting
Y . However, due to the estimation error, the threshold is different compared to the basic model. The
threshold decreases as qs decreases i.e. primaries select N w.p. 1 for larger values of s. Intuitively, the
uncertainty regarding the channel state increases as the estimation error increases, thus, the uncertainty
of the channel state increases even when primary selects Y . A primary is more reluctant to select Y .
Hence, primary selects N w.p. 1 for smaller values of s. We also characterize p as a function of s
and show that p decreases monotonically with s.
• The expected payoff of each primary is strictly higher than (v−c)(1−q) when a primary randomizes
between Y and N (i.e. s < T ) and qs < 1. In the basic model, we have shown that the expected
payoff of each primary is (v − c)(1− q) irrespective of the value of s. Thus, the error in estimation
increases the payoff of each primary which negates the conventional wisdom that expected payoff of
a primary should increase as the estimation error decreases. The payoff of each primary also increases
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with the decrease in s when qs < 1. Hence, in contrast to the basic model, the expected payoff of
each primary depends on the value of s.
• In NE pricing strategy:
– When a primary selects Y and estimates that the channel state of its competitor is 1, then it
selects its price from the interval [p˜1, LN ].
– When a primary selects N , then it selects its price from the interval [LN , L0].
– When a primary selects Y and estimates that the channel state of its competitor is 0, then it
selects its price from the interval [L0, v].
If qs = 1, a primary always selects v w.p. 1 when the primary selects Y and the channel state of the
competitor is 0 since the primary will always be able to sell its channel because of the unavailability
of its competitor. However, when qs < 1, there is a potential error in the estimation, thus, a primary
randomizes among prices from an interval [L0, v] even when the primary estimates that the channel
state of its competitor is 0. Also note that when a primary estimates that the channel state of its
competitor is 1 (0,resp.), then its competitor is more likely to be available (unavailable, resp.), hence,
the primary selects lower (higher, resp.) prices compared to the setting where a primary selects N .
C. High s
First, we state some results which we use throughout this section. Note that when a primary decides
to estimate the CSI of its competitor, it estimates the channel state of its competitor is 1 w.p. qqs + (1−
q)(1−qs) and the primary estimates the channel state of its competitor is 0 w.p. (1−q)qs+q(1−qs). Note
that when qs = 1, then the above probabilities becomes q and 1 − q respectively. If a primary estimates
that its competitor’s channel state is 1, then the actual channel state is 1 w.p.
qsq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) . (11)
Similarly, if a primary estimates that its competitor’s channel state is 0, then the actual channel state of
its competitor is 1 w.p.
q(1− qs)
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs) . (12)
Note that when qs = 1, then both the above probabilities become 1.
Our main result in this section shows that
Theorem 5. There exists a NE where each primary selects N w.p. 1 if s ≥ (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q). In
the NE pricing strategy, each primary selects its price according to φ(·) (described in (2)). The expected
payoff of each primary is (v − c)(1− q).
Proof: We show that a primary does not have any profitable unilateral deviation when the other
primary follows the strategy prescribed in the theorem. Towards this end, we, first, show that under N
the maximum expected payoff of a primary is (v − c)(1 − q) (Step i). It is attained when the primary
follows the strategy φ(·) (Step ii). Subsequently, we show that if the primary selects Y , then its expected
payoff is at most (v− c)(1− q) which will show that the primary does not have any profitable unilateral
deviation (Step iii).
Step i: At any price x ∈ [p˜, v] the expected payoff of a primary is
(x− c)(1− qφ(x)) = (v − c)(1− q) (from (2)) (13)
A price strictly less than p˜ will fetch a payoff strictly less than (v−c)(1−q) (by (4)). Thus, the maximum
expected payoff of a primary under N is (v − c)(1− q).
Step ii: Note from (13) that a primary attains the maximum expected payoff when it selects its price
from the interval [p˜, v].
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Step ii: Now, we show that if primary 1 selects Y , it can not get a strictly higher payoff when s ≥
(v− c)(1− q)(2qqs− q). Towards this end, we show that when a primary selects Y and estimates that the
channel state of the other primary is 1, then it will attain a maximum expected payoff of (v−c)(1−q)−s
(Step ii.a). Subsequently, we show that if the primary selects estimates that the channel state of the
competitor is 0, then it will attain a maximum expected payoff of (v− c)(1− q) qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s
(Step ii.b.). Finally, we show that the expected payoff of the primary is at most (v − c)(1 − q) when it
selects Y (Step ii.c.).
Step ii.a: Suppose that the primary 1 selects Y and estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 1.
Using (11) the expected payoff of primary 1 at any price x ∈ [p˜, v] is
(x− c)(1− qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)φ(x))− s
= (x− c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)(1−
p˜− c
x− c))− s
= (x− c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜− c)
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s (14)
Note that p˜ − c = (v − c)(1 − q). Since qs > qqs + (1 − q)(1 − qs) when qs > 1/2, thus, the above is
maximized at p˜, hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain when it estimates the
channel state of its competitor is 1 is
(v − c)(1− q)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (v − c)(1− q)
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s
= (v − c)(1− q)− s (15)
Step ii.b: Now, suppose that the primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0. Using
(12) the expected payoff of primary 1 at any price x ∈ [p˜, v] in this case is
(x− c)(1− (1− qs)q
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q)φ(x))− s
= (x− c)(1− 1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q)(1−
p˜− c
x− c))− s
= (x− c)(1− 1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q)) + (p˜− c)
1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s (16)
The above is maximized at x = v. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that a primary can attain is
(v − c) (1− q)(2qs − 1)
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) + (v − c)(1− q)
1− qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s
= (v − c)(1− q) qs
(1− qs)q + qs(1− q) − s (17)
Step ii.c: Note that a primary estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0 w.p. (1−qs)q+qs(1−q)
and the channel state of primary 2 is 1 w.p. qqs + (1− q)(1− qs). The primary also incurs the cost of s
when it selects Y . Hence, from (15) and (17) the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain by
selecting Y is
(v − c)(1− q)qs + (v − c)(1− q)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))− s
= (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q + 1)− s (18)
However, since s ≥ (v− c)(1− q)(2qqs− q), thus the maximum expected payoff that a primary can attain
by selecting Y is (v − c)(1− q). Hence, a primary does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
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Note that the threshold (v − c)(1 − q)(2qqs − q) increases as qs increases. Intuitively, as qs increases,
the uncertainty regarding the channel state of the competitors reduces, thus, a primary tends to select N
for a smaller range of the values of s.
The expected payoff of each primary is identical and equal to (v − c)(1 − q). Since both the players
select N , thus, the expected payoff does not depend on s in this case.
D. Low s
Now, we show that there exists a NE where each primary randomizes between Y and N when s <
(v− c)(1− q)(2qqs− q). Towards this end, we introduce some distribution functions parameterized by p.
The significance of p is shown later.
ψY,1(x) =0, x < p˜1
α1,p(1− p˜1 − c
x− c ), p˜1 ≤ x ≤ LN
1, x > LN (19)
ψN(x) =0, x < LN
αN,p(1− p˜2 − c
x− c − βN,p) LN ≤ x ≤ L0
1, x > L0 (20)
and, when qs < 1, then
ψY,0(x) =0, x < L0
α0,p(1− p˜3 − c
x− c − β0,p) L0 ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (21)
if qs = 1, then
ψY,0(x) = H(x− v) (22)
where H(·) is the heaviside step function or unit step function and
p˜3 − c = (v − c) (1− q)qs
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs) , p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q)qs
1− (1− p)q − pqqs
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q)
L0 − c = (p˜2 − c)/(1− (1− p)q − pqqs), LN − c = (p˜2 − c)/(1− pqqs)
p˜1 − c = (LN − c)qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
qqs + (1− qs)(1− q) . (23)
and
α1,p =
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
pqq2s
, αN,p =
1
(1− p)q , βN,p = pqqs
α0,p =
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)
pq(1− qs)2 , β0,p =
pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) . (24)
It is easy to discern that all the above distribution functions are continuous when qs < 1. When qs = 1, then
only ψY,0(·) is discontinuous which has a jump of 1 at v. Also note that the structures of ψY,1(·), ψN(·) and
ψY,0(·) are similar (i.e. variation with x is the same). However, their support sets, the scaling parameters
(i.e. α1,p, αN,p, α0,p), and the constants (i.e β0,p , βN,p ) are different.
15
When qs = 1, the values of the parameters in (23) are greatly simplified which are given by–
p˜3 − c = v − c, p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q), L0 − c = v − c
LN − c = p˜2 − c
1− pq , p˜1 − c = (LN − c)(1− p) (25)
Thus, L0 − c and p˜3 − c are the highest when qs = 1. Intuitively, when qs = 1, a primary knows that the
channel state of its competitor is unavailable w.p. 1 if the primary estimates that the channel state of the
competitor is 0. Thus, the primary selects v w.p. 1.
Now, we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 6. Consider the following strategy profile: Each primary selects Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1 − p
where p satisfies the following equality
p˜2 − c = (p˜1 − c)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜3 − c)(q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))− s (26)
where p˜1, p˜2 and p˜3 are given in (23). While selecting Y , each primary selects its price from ψY,1(·) (given
in (19)) if the estimated channel state of the other primary is 1 and each primary selects its price from
ψY,0(·) (given in (21)) if the estimated channel state of the other primary is 0. While selecting N , each
primary selects its price using ψN(·) (given in (20)).
The above strategy profile is an NE when s < (v − c)(1 − q)(2qqs − q). The above strategy profile is
unique in the class of symmetric NE strategies. The expected payoff that each primary gets is p˜2 − c.
Discussion: Note that when qs = 1, we know from Theorem 4 that the strategy profile is unique one
among all strategy profiles not only symmetric ones. There is no equilibrium where both the players select
Y w.p. 1 even when qs < 1 (we have already shown the above for qs = 1 in Theorem 1).
Now, we show that there exists a unique solution of (26) in p in the interval 0 < p < 1 when
0 < s < q(v − c)(1− q)(2qs − 1).
Observation 1. There exists a unique solution in p ∈ (0, 1) of the equation (26) when 0 < s < (v −
c)(1− q)(2qqs − q). As s decreases p increases.
Proof: First noe that (26) can be written as
p˜2 − c− (p˜1 − c)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) = (p˜3 − c)(q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))− s.mber
Using (23) we can rewrite the above as
(v − c)(1− q)qs 1− (1− p)q − pqqs
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q)
(
1− (qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs))
(1− pqqs)
)
= (v − c)(1− q)qs − s (27)
First, we show that the left hand of (27) is strictly increasing in p (Step i). Next, we show that when
p = 0, the left hand side of (27) is less than the right hand side and when p = 1, the left hand side of (27)
is greater than the right hand side (Step ii). Since the left hand side of (27) is continuous in p and strictly
increasing in p, there exists a unique solution p ∈ (0, 1) of (27). The last part easily follows as the right
hand side of (27) decreases with s, the left hand side of (27) is strictly increasing in p and independent
of s. Now, we show steps i and ii.
Step i: By differentiating the left hand side of (27) we can show that
1− qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
1− pqqs (28)
is strictly increasing in p when qs > 1/2. On the other hand, it is easy to discern that (v − c)(1 −
q)qs
1− (1− p)q − pqqs
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q) is non-decreasing in p when qs > 1/2. Thus, the left hand side of (27) is
strictly increasing in p.
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Step ii: When p = 0, then the value of left hand side of the equation (27) is
(v − c)(1− q)(1− qqs − (1− q)(1− qs)) = (v − c)(1− q)(qs + q − 2qqs) (29)
Now, (v−c)(1−q)qs−(v−c)(1−q)(qs+q−2qqs) = (v−c)(1−q)(2qqs−q). Since s < (1−q)(v−c)(2qqs−q),
thus, the left hand side of (27) is less than the right hand side.
Now when p = 1, then the left hand side of (27) is
(v − c)(1− q)qs[ 1− qqs
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs −
qqs(1− qs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs ]
= (v − c)(1− q)qs[ qq
2
s + q + qs − 3qqs
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs ]
= (v − c)(1− q)qs[q(1− qs)
2 + qs(1− q)
q(1− qs)2 + (1− q)qs ] = (v − c)(1− q)qs (30)
Since s > 0, thus, the left hand side of (27) is greater than the right hand side.
Since the left hand side of (27) is continuous function of p, thus, by intermediate value theorem there
exists a solution in the interval (0, 1).
Next, we show that the expected payoff of a primary is a strictly greater than (v − c)(1 − q) when
qs < 1 and the payoff increases with the decrease in s.
Lemma 2. When qs < 1, p˜2 − c increases with the decrease in s and p˜2 − c is strictly greater than
(v − c)(1− q) when s < (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q).
Proof: Now, it is easy to discern that p˜2− c is strictly increasing in p when qs < 1. Now, p increases
with the decrease in s (by Observation 1) when s < (v − c)(1− q)(2qqs − q). Hence, p˜2 − c is a strictly
decreasing function in s when qs < 1.
When p = 0, then p˜2− c = (v− c)(1− q) (by (23)). Since p˜2− c is strictly increasing in p when qs < 1
and s < q(v − c)(1− q)(2qs − 1), hence p˜2 − c > (v − c)(1− q).
Note from Theorem 6 that the expected payoff attained by a primary under the NE is p˜2 − c. From
(25) note that p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1 − q) when qs = 1. Thus, the above lemma entails that the expected
payoff of each primary increases when there is an error in estimating the channel state of the competitor.
This contradicts the conventional wisdom that the payoff should increase with the decrease in error in the
estimation. In Section IV-B we have already explained the apparent reason behind this result.
The above lemma entails that the expected payoff increases as s decreases when qs < 1. Note that
when qs = 1, the expected payoffs of primaries are independent of s which we have already seen in the
basic model (Section ??).
Note that when qs = 1, then ψY,0(·) has a jump of size 1 i.e. a primary will select v w.p. 1 as the
primary will always be able to sell its channel. However, when qs < 1, then a primary selects its price
using a continuous distribution from the interval [L0, v] where L0 < v. We have already explained the
reason behind this in Section IV-B.
1) Proof of Theorem 6: Before digging into the details of proof, we state few more results which we
use throughout. Note from (23) that
(p˜3 − c)(qs(1− q) + q(1− qs))/[qs(1− q) + pq(1− qs)2] = L0 − c (31)
Since qs > 1/2, thus, by cross multiplication, it is easy to see that
qs((1− qs)q + (1− q)qs)
(1− qs)(qqs + (1− qs)(1− q)) > 1 (32)
We show that primary 1 can not gain higher profit by deviating from the strategy prescribed in Theorem 6
when primary 2 follows the strategy prescribed in Theorem 6. This will complete the proof. Toward this
end, we first show that when primary 1 selects Y and it estimates that the channel state of its competitor
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is 1, then it will attain a maximum expected payoff of p˜1 − c − s. The maximum expected payoff is
attained when it follows the strategy ψY,1(·) (Step i). Subsequently, we show that under Y , when the
primary estimates the channel state as 0, then the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain
is p˜3 − c− s and it is attained when the primary follows the strategy ψY,0(·) (Step ii). Subsequently, we
show that the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain under Y is p˜2 − c and it is attained
when primary 1 follows the strategy (Step iii). Subsequently, we show that when primary 1 selects N ,
then its maximum expected payoff is p˜2−c and it is attained when the primary follows the strategy ψN(·)
(Step iv). Finally, we show that the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 is p˜2− c and it is attained if
primary 1 follows the strategy profile (Step v).
Step i: Suppose that primary 1 selects Y and estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 1. We
show that the maximum expected payoff attained by the primary 1 is p˜1 − c− s and this is attained only
when the primary selects its price from the interval [p˜1, LN ]. Toward this end, we first show any price
in the interval [p˜1, LN ] will fetch an expected payoff of p˜1 − c − s (Step i.a.). Subsequently, we show
that if primary 1 selects a price from the interval [LN , L0] and [L0, v] it will fetch an expected payoff of
less than p˜1 − c − s in Step i.b. and Step i.c. respectively. Note that at any price less than p˜1 will fetch
a strictly lower payoff compared to the price at p˜1 as primary 2 does not select any price lower than or
equal to p˜1. Thus, this will complete step i.
Step i.a: Here, we are considering the scenario where primary 1 estimates that the channel state of
primary 2 is 1. Under Y , when the primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 1, then the
probability that the channel state of primary 2 is 1 is
qsq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) (33)
Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜1, LN ]. When the channel state of primary 2 is 1
it will select a price less than or equal to x only if it selects Y , it estimates the channel state of primary
1 as 1 and selects a price less than or equal to x.The primary 2 selects Y w.p. p. Now, when the channel
of primary 1 is available, then primary 2 estimates the channel state of primary 1 as 1 w.p. qs and selects
a price less than or equal to x w.p. ψY,1(x). The channel state of primary 2 is 1 with probability given in
(33). Hence, the expected payoff of primary 1 when its channel is available and selects a price x in the
interval [p˜1, LN ] is
(x− c)(1− pqsqqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)ψY,1(x))− s = p˜1 − c− s from (19). (34)
Step i.b.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [LN , L0]. Note that if the channel of primary
2 is available, it will select a price less than or equal to x if if one of the following occurs–i) primary 2
selects Y and estimates the channel state of primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a price less
than or equal to x. (i) occurs with probability pqs and (ii) occurs with probability (1 − p)ψN(x). Since
primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 1, thus, the probability that the true state of the
channel of primary 2 is indeed 1 is given by (33). Thus, the probability that the primary 2 will select a
price less than or equal to x is
pq2sq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) +
(1− p)qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)ψN(x)
Thus, at x, the expected payoff of primary 1 is–
(x− c)(1− pq
2
sq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) −
(1− p)qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)ψN(x))− s
= (x− c)(1− pq
2
sq
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) −
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)(1−
p˜2 − c
x− c − pqqs))− s from (20)
= (x− c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜2 − c)
qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s (35)
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Since qs > 1/2, the co-efficient is negative. Thus, the above is maximized at x = LN . Using (23) , the
above expression is thus, upper bounded by
(LN − c)(1− qs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (LN − c)
qs(1− pqqs)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s
= (LN − c)qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) − s = p˜1 − c− s from (23) (36)
Step i.c: From steps i.a. and i.b. we have already shown that when the maximum expected payoff of
primary 1 is p˜1− c−s at a price in the interval [p˜1, L0]. When qs = 1, L0 = v (from (25)). Thus, it shows
that when qs = 1, the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 is indeed p˜1 − c− s.
Now, we consider the case where qs < 1 and primary 1 selects price x ∈ [L0, v]. When the channel
of primary 2 is available, then primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x if one of the following
occurs–i) it selects Y and estimates that the channel state of primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N , iii)
primary 2 selects Y , estimates that the channel state of primary 1 is 0 and selects a price less than or
equal to x. (i) occurs with probability pqs since the channel of primary 1 is available. (ii) occurs with
probability 1−p. (iii) occurs with probability p(1−qs)ψY,0(x) (since the channel of primary 1 is available).
On the other hand the probability that the channel of primary 2 is available is given by (33). Hence, the
probability that primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x is
pqq2s + (1− p)qqs + pqqs(1− qs)ψY,0(x)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
Thus, at any price x ∈ [L0, v], the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− pqq
2
s + (1− p)qqs + pqqs(1− qs)ψY,0(x)
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs) )− s
= (x− c)(1− pqq
2
s + (1− p)qqs
qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))− s−
(x− c) qs[(1− q)qs + (1− qs)q]
(1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)](1−
p˜3 − c
x− c −
pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs)
(1− q)qs + (1− qs)q ) from (21)
= (x− c)(1− [q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)]qs
(1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)]) + (p˜3 − c)
[q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)]qs
(1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)] − s (37)
By (32) the co-efficient of (x− c) is negative, thus, the maximum of the above expression is attained at
x = L0. Thus, the expected payoff at x is upper bounded by expected payoff at L0. From (36) (which also
gives the expected payoff at L0) we have already bounded the expected payoff at L0 which is p˜1− c− s.
Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain in this case is p˜1− c− s and it is attained
at any price in the interval [p˜1, LN ].
Step ii: Suppose that primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0. When qs = 1, then the
channel of primary 2 is unavailable with probability 1. Hence, primary 1 will attain the highest possible
payoff at v and the payoff is (v− c)− s = p˜3− c− s (by (25)). Thus, we consider the case when qs < 1.
We show that the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 1 is p˜3 − c− s and it is attained at any
price in the interval [L0, v]. Towards this end, we first show that any price from the interval [L0, v] will
fetch an expected payoff of p˜3 − c − s (Step ii.a.). Subsequently, we show that any price in the interval
[LN , L0] and [p˜1, LN ] will fetch an expected payoff of at most p˜3− c− s (Steps ii.b. and ii.c. resp.). Any
price less than p˜1 will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than the payoff at p˜1, thus, this will complete
Step ii.
Step ii.a: When primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0, then the probability that
the channel state of primary 2 is 1 is
q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) (38)
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Suppose that primary 1 selects a price in the interval x ∈ [L0, v]. If the channel of primary 2 is available,
then, the primary 2 will select a price less than or equal to x if one of the following occurs–i) it selects
Y and estimates that the channel state of primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N , iii) primary 2 selects Y ,
estimates that the channel state of primary 1 is 0 and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs
with probability pqs since the channel of primary 1 is available. (ii) occurs with probability 1 − p. (iii)
occurs with probability p(1− qs)ψY,0(x) (since the channel of primary 1 is available). On the other hand
the probability that the channel of primary 2 is available is given by (38) as primary 1 estimates that the
channel state of primary 2 is 0. Hence, the probability that primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to
x is
pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs) + pq(1− qs)2ψY,0(x)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) .
Hence, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pq(1− qs)qs + (1− p)q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) −
pq(1− qs)2
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)ψY,0(x))− s
= p˜3 − c− s from (21) (39)
Step ii.b.: Now, suppose primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [LN , L0]. When the channel of primary
2 is available, then primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x if one of the following occurs–i)
primary 2 selects Y and estimates the channel state of primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a
price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with probability pqs and (ii) occurs with probability (1−p)ψN(x).
Given that the primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0, the probability that channel
of primary 1 is available is given by (38). Thus, the probability that primary 2 selects a price less than
or equal to x is given by
(pqs + (1− p)ψN(x))q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) (40)
Hence, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pq(1− qs)qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) −
(1− p)q(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)ψN(x))− s
= (x− c)(1− pqqs(1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))− (x− c)
1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)(1−
p˜2 − c
x− c − pqqs)− s from (20)
= (x− c)(1− 1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)) + (p˜2 − c)
1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) − s (41)
By (32) the above is maximized at x = L0. Hence, the maximum possible expected payoff is
(L0 − c)(1− 1− qs
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)) + (L0 − c)
(1− qs)(1− (1− p)q − pqqs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) − s
= (L0 − c)(1− [(1− p)q + pqqs](1− qs)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) )− s
= (L0 − c)pq(1− qs)
2 + qs(1− q)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q) − s = p˜3 − c− s from (23) (42)
Step ii.c.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜1, LN ]. Now, if the channel
of primary 2 is available, then it selects a price less than or equal to x if it selects Y , estimates that
the channel state of primary 1 is 1 and selects a price less than or equal to x. The above occurs with
probability pqsψY,1(x). The probability that the channel state of primary 2 is 1 given that the primary 1
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estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0 is given by (38). Hence at x the expected payoff of
primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− pq(1− qs)qsψY,1(x)
q(1− qs) + qs(1− q))− s
= (x− c)(1− (1− qs)[qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)]
qs[q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)] (1−
p˜1 − c
x− c ))− s from (19)
= (x− c)(1− (1− qs)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))
qs((1− qs)q + qs(1− q)) ) + (p˜1 − c)
(1− qs)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs))
qs(q(1− qs) + qs(1− q)) − s
By (32) the above is maximized at x = LN . Thus, the expected payoff at any x ∈ [p˜1, LN ] is upper
bounded by the expected payoff at LN . Now, from (42) (which also gives the expected payoff at LN ) we
have already shown that the expected payoff at LN is upper bounded by p˜3− c− s. Hence, the maximum
expected payoff attained by primary 1 in this case is p˜3 − c− s and it is attained at price in the interval
[L0, v].
Step iii: In Step (i), we have shown that under Y if primary 1 estimates that the channel state of primary
2 is 1, then the maximum expected payoff is p˜1 − c − s. In Step (ii), we have shown that if primary 1
estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 0, then the maximum expected payoff is p˜3−c−s. Primary
1 estimates that the channel state of primary 2 is 1 w.p. qqs + (1 − q)(1 − qs) and the channel state of
primary 2 is 0 w.p. (1− q)qs + q(1− qs). Thus, under Y , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1
can attain is
(p˜1 − c− s)(qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)) + (p˜3 − c− s)((1− q)qs + q(1− qs)) = p˜2 − c from (26). (43)
We have already shown that the payoff is achieved when primary 1 follows the strategy prescribed in the
theorem.
Step iv: Now, we show that under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is
p˜2 − c and it is attained at every price in the interval [LN , L0]. Toward this end, we first show that if
primary 1 selects a price from the interval [LN , L0] it will fetch an expected payoff of p˜2 − c (Step iv.a).
Subsequently, we show that if the primary selects any price from the interval [L0, v] or [p˜1, LN ] it can
only get an expected payoff of at most p˜2 − c (Step iv.b. and Step iv.c. resp.).
Step iv.a: Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [LN , L0]. When the channel of primary 2 is
available, then primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to x if one of the following occurs–i) primary
2 selects Y and estimates the channel state of primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a price
less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with probability pqs and (ii) occurs with probability (1 − p)ψN(x).
Now, when primary 1 selects N it only knows that the channel of primary 2 is available w.p. q. Thus,
the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pqqs − (1− p)qψN(x)) = p˜2 − c from (20). (44)
Step iv.b: Note that when qs = 1, then L0 = v. Thus, we consider the case when qs < 1. Suppose
primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [L0, v]. If the channel of primary 2 is available, then, the primary
2 will select a price less than or equal to x if one of the following occurs–i) it selects Y and estimates
that the channel state of primary 1 is 1, ii) primary 2 selects N , iii) primary 2 selects Y , estimates that the
channel state of primary 1 is 0 and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with probability pqs
since the channel of primary 1 is available. (ii) occurs with probability 1− p. (iii) occurs with probability
p(1− qs)ψY,0x) (since the channel of primary 1 is available). When primary 1 selects N , it only knows
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that the channel of primary 2 is available w.p q. Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− pqqs − (1− p)q − pq(1− qs)ψY,0(x))
= (x− c)(1− pqqs − (1− p)q)−
(x− c)(1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs (1−
p˜3 − c
x− c −
pqqs(1− qs) + (1− p)q(1− qs)
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs) ) from (21)
= (x− c)(1− (1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs ) + (p˜3 − c)
(1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs
Since qs > 1/2, the above is maximized at x = L0. Thus, using (31), the above expression is upper
bounded by
(L0 − c)(1− (1− q)qs + q(1− qs)
1− qs ) + (L0 − c)
pq(1− qs)2 + qs(1− q)
1− qs
= (L0 − c)(1− q(1− qs)(1− p(1− qs))
1− qs ) = (L0 − c)(1− (1− p)q − pqqs) = p˜2 − c. (45)
where the last equality follows from (23).
Step iv.c: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜1, LN ]. Now, if the channel
of primary 2 is available, then it selects a price less than or equal to x if it selects Y , estimates that
the channel state of primary 1 is 1 and selects a price less than or equal to x. The above occurs with
probability pqsψY,1(x). The channel of primary 2 is available w.p. q. Thus, at any price x in the interval
[p˜1, LN ] the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− pqqsψY,1(x))
= (x− c)(1− qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
) + (p˜1 − c)qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
from (19).
Since qs > 1/2, the above is maximized at x = LN . Thus, using (23), the maximum expected payoff is
(LN − c)(1− qqs + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
) + (LN − c)qqs(1− pqs) + (1− q)(1− qs)
qs
= (LN − c)(1− qqspqs
qs
) = p˜2 − c. (46)
Again the last equality follows from (23).
Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 1 under N is p˜2− c. This is attained at any
price in the interval [LN , L0] which we have shown in Step iv.a.
Step v: Thus, either under Y or under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is
p˜2− c. Hence, any randomization between Y and N will also yield an expected payoff of p˜2− c. Primary
1 can attain the payoff of p˜2 − c following the strategy profile. Hence, primary 1 does not have any
unilateral profitable deviation. Hence, the result follows.
Example 2. We illustrate the NE pricing strategy in Theorem 6 for an example where v = 50, c = 0, s =
4, qs = 0.8, q = 0.5. Since s < (2qs − 1)q(v − c)(1− q), the NE pricing strategy is given in Theorem 6.
Using the fsolve function of MATLAB we obtain the unique p satisfying (26). Given p, ψY,1(·), ψN(·) and
ψY,1(·) are readily obtained and shown in Fig. 10.
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Fig. 5: Variation of p with qs for an
example setting: v = 50, c = 0, s =
4, q = 0.5. p is 0 for qs ≤ 0.67, as
s is above the threshold q(v − c)(1 −
q)(2qs − 1) for this region.
Fig. 6: Variation of the expected pay-
off of a primary with qs in the same
example setting considered in Fig. 5.
Fig. 7: Variation of the expected pay-
off of a primary with s in an example
setting: v = 50, q = 0.5, c = 0, qs =
3/4.
Fig. 8: Variation of p with s in the
same example setting as considered
in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 9: Variation of the price vari-
ance for an example setting:v =
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Fig. 10: The price distributions ψY,0(·), ψY,1(·)
and ψN (·) in the example sceanrio described
in Example 2. Note that they are non-
overlapping; the supports of ψY,1,, ψN and
ψY,0 are [21.08, 38.3], [38.3, 48.3] and [48.3, 50]
respv.
E. Numerical Results
Fig. 5 shows that the probability p with which a primary selects Y increases as qs increases. Intuitively,
when qs increases, the uncertainty of the channel state of the competitor decreases when a primary selects
Y , thus, the primary selects Y with a higher probability. Additionally, Fig. 5 shows that the increment of
p is sub-linear with qs.
Fig. 6 shows the variation of the expected payoff of a primary with qs. When 0.5 < qs ≤ 0.67, a primary
selects N w.p. 1, hence, the expected payoff is (v−c)(1−q) for qs ≤ 0.67. The expected payoff increases
as qs increases when 0.67 < qs ≤ 0.83. After that the payoff decreases and ultimately the expected payoff
again becomes equal to (v− c)(1− q) when qs = 1. Thus, the payoff of a primary is higher when there is
an error in estimation of the channel state compared to the setting where there is no error in estimation
which negates the conventional wisdom that the payoff should increases with the decreases in the error in
the estimation. We have already provided the potential reasons behind this behavior in the section IV-B.
Fig. 7 shows the variation of the expected payoff of a primary with s. Note from Lemma 2 that the
expected payoff of a primary increases as s decreases when a primary selects Y with a positive probability.
Fig. 7 verifies the above result. Specifically, as s increases, the expected payoff decreases when s < 6.5.
Additionally, the expected payoff decreases sub-linearly. When s ≥ 6.5, a primary only selects N and
attains an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q), thus, the payoff becomes independent of s in this regime.
Fig. 8 shows that p, the probability with which a primary selects Y increases as s decreases. When
s ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q)(2qs − 1) = 6.25, then the primary selects N w.p. 1 i.e. p = 0. Additionally, Fig. 8
shows that p decreases sub-linearly as s increases.
Fig. 9 shows the variation of the variance of the price selected by a primary with s and qs. Note that
the variance decreases as s decreases. Thus, when a primary selects N with a higher probability, the price
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Fig. 11: Variation of upper and lower end-points of the
support sets of ψY,1 (L1 (= p˜1) and LN , resp.), ψN (LN , and
L0 resp.) and ψY,0 (L0 and v) with s in the same example
setting considered in Fig. 7.
Fig. 12: Variation of upper and lower end-points of the
support sets of ψY,1 (L1 and LN , resp.), ψN (LN , and L0
resp.) and ψY,0 (L0 and v) with qs in the same example setting
considered in Fig. 5.
volatility is lower. When s ≥ q(v − c)(1− q)(2qs − 1), each primary selects N w.p. 1, thus, the variance
becomes independent of s. This is because φ(·), the price selection strategy from which a primary selects
its price when s ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q)(2qs − 1), is independent of s. Note that Fig. 9 also shows that the
variance also decreases as qs decreases. Intuitively, as qs decreases, a primary selects N with a higher
probability, thus, the variance decreases. Note that buyers in general do not like a market where the prices
have higher variances. Thus, when s is low or qs is high, a buyer may not like the setting.
Fig. 11 shows the variations of the end-points of the support sets of the price distributions. Note that
when s = 0, LN = L0 as primaries select N with 0 probability. As s increases, LN and L0 increase
as primaries select N with positive probability; primaries select prices from a larger interval when it
selects N as s increases. Note that the lower end-point of ψY,1(·), p˜1 (L1 in the figure) also increases as
s increases. Thus, the price interval from which a primary selects its price Y decreases as s increases.
Intuitively, as s increases, a primary selects Y with a lower probability, thus the support also decreases.
When s ≥ 6.25, the primary only selects N , thus, p˜1 = LN and L0 = v.
Fig. 12 shows the variation of the end-points of the support sets of the price distributions. When
qs ≤ 0.67, primaries only select N . Thus, p˜1 = LN and L0 = v. When qs > 0.67, primaries select Y with
positive probabilities. p˜1 decreases as qs increases. Thus, a primary selects a lower price when it selects
Y and estimates that the channel state of the competitor is 1. Intuitively, as qs increases, the uncertainty
reduces, thus, the competitor’s channel is more likely to be available when a primary estimates that the
channel state of the primary is 1. Hence, the primary selects a lower price. Since primary selects Y when
qs > 0.67, L0 decreases initially. However, L0 increases when qs becomes very high. Note that when qs
is very high, then a primary is aware that the channel of the competitor is more likely to be unavailable,
hence it selects a high price. Thus, L0 is close to v when qs is very high. Note also that LN increases with
qs. Intuitively, when qs increases, a primary selects N with a lower probability, thus, a primary selects its
price from a shorter interval when it selects N .
V. UNEQUAL COSTS
We, now, investigate the generalization of the basic model where each different primaries incur different
costs to acquire the CSI of their respective competitors depicted in Section II-B2. Primary i incurs the
cost si to acquire the CSI of its competitor. Without loss of generality we assume that s1 < s2.
A. Goals
The impact of different acquisition costs on the payoff of each primary and the frequency with which
each primary selects Y is not apriori clear. For example, primary 1 which has a lower acquisition cost of
CSI, can gain more compared to primary 2 by acquiring the CSI of primary 2 by paying a lower cost.
However, primary 2 also acquires the CSI of primary 1 and selects a lower price when the channel of
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primary 1 is available, thus, primary 1 also selects a lower price in response, which in turn reduces the
payoff of primary 1. The pricing decision of each primary also depends on the frequencies with which
each primary selects Y . We resolve all these quandaries.
B. Results
We summarize our main findings here–
• The NE strategy is of the form [T, pi] for primary i with T = q(v − c)(1 − q). Note that T is the
same as the basic model, however, since different primaries have different acquisition costs, pis are
different. For example, when s1 < T ≤ s2, then primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1, but primary 2 does not
select Y . Even when s2 < T , then primary 2 selects p2 where p1 > p2 as s1 < s2.
• The difference in the acquisition costs lead to different payoffs for the primaries. In contrast to the
basic model, primary 1 attains a higher payoff compared to the expected payoff of primary 2 when
primary 1 selects Y with a positive probability (i.e. s < T ) (Theorems 8, 9). The expected payoff of
primary 1 becomes close to the payoff of the primary 2 as the difference between s1 and s2 decreases.
The expected payoff of primary 2 is in fact independent of s2. The expected payoff of the primaries
are the same when s1 ≥ T , as both of them only select N .
• Primary i selects its price from the interval [L, p˜i] ([p˜i, v], resp.) , when the primary selects Y (N ,
resp.) and the channel of the competitor is available. However, there are also some differences in
the pricing structure compared to the basic model because of different acquisition costs. Primary 2
selects v with a positive probability when it selects N when s1 < q(v− c)(1− q) and the probability
decreases as the difference between s1 and s2 decreases (Theorems 9). Thus, the primary 2 has
a discontinuity at v in contrast to the basic model where primaries select prices from continuous
distribution. Additionally, we show that p˜1 > p˜2. Thus, primary 2 selects lower prices when it selects
Y and the channel of primary 1 is available. On the other hand, when primary 2 selects N , its selects
higher prices with higher probabilities.
C. High s1, s2
Our first result in this section shows that
Theorem 7. When s1 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q), then in the unique NE, both the primaries select N w.p. 1
and select their prices according to φ(·) (given in (2)). Both the primaries attain an expected payoff of
q(v − c)(1− q).
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3, thus, we omit it here.
Note that since s2 > s1, s2 > q(v− c)(1− q). Thus, the above theorem shows that the expected payoff
of primaries are identical when sis are sufficiently high as both the primaries select N .
D. Low s1, high s2
Now, we consider the setting where s1 < q(v− c)(1− q), but s2 ≥ q(v− c)(1− q). We show that there
exists a NE where primary 1 randomizes between Y and N , and primary 2 selects N .
We first introduce some pricing distributions which we use throughout this section–
ψ1,Y (x) =0, if x < p˜
1
qp1
(1− p˜− c
x− c), if p˜ ≤ x ≤ p˜1
1, if x > p˜1 (47)
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ψ1,N(x) =0, if x < p˜1
1
q(1− p1)(1−
p˜− c
x− c − qp1)if p˜1 ≤ x ≤ v
1, if x > v (48)
ψ2(x) =0, if x < p˜
(1− p˜− c
x− c), if p˜ ≤ x < p˜1
1
q
(1− p˜N − c
x− c ), if p˜1 ≤ x < v
1, if x ≥ v. (49)
where
p˜N = (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1 + c
p˜ = (v − c)(1− q) + c. p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)
1− qp1 . (50)
and
p1 =
1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
2
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 ) (51)
Note from (50) and (51) that
p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)[(v − c)(1− q)− s1]
(v − c)(1− q)2 =
(v − c)(1− q)− s1
1− q (52)
ψ2(·) clearly has a jump at v as s1 < q(v − c)(1− q). From the expression of ψ2(·) one may think that
ψ2(·) has a jump at p˜1. We first rule out the above possibility.
Observation 2. ψ2(·) does not have any jump except at v.
Proof: First, note that since s1 < q(v − c)(1− q), thus, ψ2(·) has a jump at v.
Next, we show that ψ2(·) does not have any jump at p˜1. The continuity of ψ2(·) at any other point can
easily be observed.
Note from (52) the left hand limit is
1− (v − c)(1− q)
p˜1 − c = 1−
(v − c)(1− q)2
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (53)
Again from (52), the right hand limit and the value of ψ2(·) at p˜1 is
1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
p˜1 − c =
1
q
(1− (1− q)[(v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1]
(v − c)(1− q)− s1
= 1− (v − c)(1− q)
2
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (54)
Hence, ψ2(·) does not have any jump at p˜1. Hence, the result follows.
The continuity of ψ1,Y (·) and ψ1,N(·) can be easily concluded. Note that the variations of ψ1,Y (·),
ψ1,N(·) and ψ2(·) are similar they differ only in the support and the scaling parameters.
Now, we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 8. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1 and N w.p. 1−p1 (p1 is
given in (51)) and primary 2 selects N w.p. 1. While selecting Y , if the channel of primary 2 is available,
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then primary 1 selects its price according to ψ1,Y (·), otherwise it selects v w.p. 1. While selecting N ,
primary 1 selects its price according to ψ1,N(·). Primary 2 selects its price according to ψ2(·).
The above strategy profile is the unique NE when s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1− q) and s1 < q(v − c)(1− q). The
expected payoff that primary 1 attains is (v − c)(1 − q) + q(v − c)(1 − q) − s1 and the expected payoff
of primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q).
Discussion: Note that when s1 < q(v − c)(1 − q) and s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q), the payoff of primary 1
is higher compared to the primary 2. Apparently, when s1 is low, then primary 1 takes advantage of the
acquired CSI and gains more compared to primary 2. Primary 2 can not do the same as the cost s2 is
high. The expected payoff of primary 1 also increases with the decrease in s1. Note that the threshold
above which primary i only selects N is q(v − c)(1− q); the threshold is the same for both the players.
The probability p1 increases with decrease in s1, hence, primary 1 is more likely to select Y with the
decrease in s1.
Since p1 increases as s1 decreases. p˜1 also increases as s1 decreases (from (52)) . Thus, ψ1,Y (·) has
larger support as s1 decreases.
Under Y , primary 1 selects a price from the interval [p˜, p˜1] when the channel of primary 2 is available;
under N , primary 1 selects a price from the interval [p˜1, v]. Hence, primary 1 selects higher price under N
as the uncertainty of the CSI of other primary increases. Also note that ψ2(·) overlaps both with ψ1,Y (·)
and ψ1,N(·).
Also note that ψ2(·) has a jump at v. Thus, primary 2 selects v with a positive probability. Intuitively,
primary 1 selects Y with a higher probability. Thus, primary 1 knows the channel state of primary 2
with a higher probability and thus and selects a lower price. In response, primary 2 has two options– i)
selects a high price with high probability ( at least it can gain more when the channel of the primary 1 is
not available), ii) selects a low price ( it can increase the probability of winning). Our result shows that
primary 2 selects the first option.
1) Proof of Theorem 8: First, we show that there is no profitable deviation for primary 1 when primary
2 follows the prescribed strategy stated in Theorem 8 (Case I), subsequently, we show that there is also
no profitable deviation for primary 2 when primary 1 follows the prescribed strategy stated in Theorem 8
(Case II).
Case I: In the first step (i), we show that primary 1 can attain a maximum expected payoff of (v −
c)(1− q) + q(v− c)(1− q)− s under Y . Next in step (ii), we show that primary 1 can attain a maximum
expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q) + q(v − c)(1 − q) − s1 under N . Finally in step (iii), we show that
primary 1 attains the maximum expected payoff following the strategy which will show that primary 1
does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
Step (i): Primary 1 selects Y . Suppose that the channel of primary 2 is available, then primary 1 will
know that w.p. 1. At any x such that p˜ ≤ x ≤ p˜1 the primary 1 gets under Y is
(x− c)(1− ψ2(x))− s1 = (v − c)(1− q)− s1 from (49)&(50). (55)
If primary 1 selects a price strictly less than p˜, then, its payoff is strictly less than p˜ − c − s1 = (v −
c)(1− q)− s1.
Now, at any v > x ≥ p˜1, the expected payoff of primary 1 in this setting is
(x− c)(1− ψ2(x))− s1
= (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
x− c ))− s1from (49)
= (x− c)(1− 1
q
) +
(v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
q
− s1 (56)
Since 1/q > 1, thus, the supremum is attained at x = p˜1. Now from (52), the maximum value is
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (57)
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Since ψ2(·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff at v is strictly less than the value at a price close
to v. Hence, when the channel of primary 2 is available, then the maximum expected payoff that primary
1 can attain at Y is (v − c)(1− q)− s1 and it is attained at any price in the interval [p˜, p˜1].
Now, when the channel of primary 2 is unavailable, the expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)− s1.
Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains in Y is
(v − c− s1)(1− q) + q[(v − c)(1− q)− s1]
= (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (58)
Step (ii) Now suppose primary 1 selects N and a price x such that p˜1 ≤ x < v. Primary 2 selects a
price less than x if the channel of primary 2 is available and selects a price less than or equal to x (it
occurs w.p. qψ2(x)). By the continuity of ψ2(·) in the interval [p˜1, v), the expected payoff of primary 1
at x is
(x− c)(1− qψ2(x)) = (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1 from (49). (59)
Since ψ2(·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is strictly less at a price close to v
compared to v. Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 at v is strictly less than (v − c)(1 − q) + q(v −
c)(1− q)− s1.
Now, at any x such that p˜ ≤ x ≤ p˜1, the expected payoff of primary 1 under N is
(x− c)(1− qψ2(x)) = (x− c)(1− q(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c ))
= (x− c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q) from (49). (60)
The supremum is attained at x = p˜1. Putting the value of p˜1 from (52) we obtain
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 + q(v − c)(1− q) (61)
The expected payoff at a price strictly less than p˜ will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than the payoff
attained at p˜. Thus, primary 1 can attain at most an expected payoff of (v−c)(1−q)+q(v−c)(1−q)−s1
under N . The maximum expected payoff is attained at any price in the interval [p˜1, v).
Step (iii): Hence, we show that the primary 1 can attain an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q) + q(v −
c)(1− q)− s under either Y or N . Thus, any randomization between Y and N will also give an expected
payoff of (v − c)(1 − q) + q(v − c)(1 − q) − s1. Now, under the strategy profile the expected payoff is
also (v − c)(1− q) + q(v − c)(1− q)− s1, hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable deviation.
Case II: Now, we show that primary 2 does not have any profitable deviation when primary 1 selects the
prescribed strategy stated in the theorem. Towards this end, we first show in Step (i) that any price in the
interval [p˜, p˜1] will give an expected payoff of (v−c)(1−q) to primary 2 when it selects N , subsequently,
we show that any price in the interval [p˜1, v] will also provide an expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q) to
primary 2 when it selects N . In step (iii), we show that any price x < p˜ will give a strictly lower payoff
compared to (v − c)(1− q) when it selects N . Finally in step (iv), we show that if primary 2 selects Y ,
then it can only get a payoff of at most (v − c)(1 − q) when s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q). This will show that
primary 2 attains the maximum expected payoff of (v− c)(1− q) and it is attained when it selects N and
selects a price in the interval [p˜, v].
Step (i): Note that when x ∈ [p˜, p˜1] primary 1 can select a price less than x only when the channel of
primary 1 is available and primary 1 selects Y , thus, at any x such that x ∈ [p˜, p˜1], the expected payoff
of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− qp1ψ1,Y (x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (47). (62)
Step (ii) When x ∈ [p˜1, v], then primary 1 selects a price lower than x only if the channel of primary 1 is
available and either it selects Y or while selecting N it selects a price less than x. Hence, the expected
payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− qp1 − q(1− p1)ψ1,N(x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (48). (63)
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(iii) At any price less than p˜ will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than p˜ − c. However, p˜ − c =
(v− c)(1− q). Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 is strictly less than (v− c)(1− q) at any price less
than p˜. Hence, primary 2 can only attain a maximum expected payoff of (v− c)(1− q) and it is attained
at the prices in the interval [p˜, v].
(iv) Now, suppose primary 2 selects Y . If the channel of primary 1 is available, then at any x ∈ [p˜, p˜1],
it will get an expected payoff of
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s2 = (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c )− s2
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 (64)
Since 1/q > 1, thus the above is maximized at x = p˜, and the maximum expected payoff is (v−c)(1−q)−s2
since p˜− c = (v − c)(1− q).
Now, if primary 2 selects a price in the interval [p˜1, v] when the channel of primary 1 is available, then
the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)ψ1,N(x)− p1)− s2 = (x− c)(1− p1 − 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c − qp1))− s2 from (48)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2
< (p˜− c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 = (v − c)(1− q)− s2 since p˜− c = (v − c)(1− q).
Thus, primary 2 attains an expected payoff of at most (v − c)(1 − q) − s2 when it selects Y and the
channel of primary 1 is available.
Now, when the channel of primary 1 is unavailable the payoff that primary 2 earns is v−c−s2. Hence,
the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 can earn by selecting Y is
q[(v − c)(1− q)− s2] + (1− q)(v − c− s2) = q(v − c)(1− q) + (v − c)(1− q)− s2 (65)
when s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1− q), thus, the primary attains at most a payoff of (v − c)(1− q). Hence, primary
2 also does not have any profitable deviation.
E. Low s1, s2
Lastly, we show that if s2 < q(v− c)(1− q) then, there exists an NE where primary 2 also randomizes
between Y and N .
Again, we introduce some price distribution functions
ψ1,Y =0, x < L
1
p1
(1− L− c
x− c ), L ≤ x ≤ p˜2
1
p1q
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
x− c ), p˜2 < x ≤ p˜1
1, x > p˜1 (66)
ψ2,Y =0, x < L
1
p2
(1− L− c
x− c ), L ≤ x ≤ p˜2
1, x > p˜2 (67)
ψ1,N =0, x < p˜1
1
q(1− p1)(1−
(v − c)(1− q)
x− c − p1q), p˜1 ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (68)
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and
ψ2,N =0, x < p˜2
1
1− p2 (1−
L− c
x− c − p2), p˜2 ≤ x < p˜1
1
q(1− p2)(1−
p˜1,N − c
x− c − p2q) p˜1 ≤ x < v
1, x ≥ v (69)
where
p˜1,N − c = (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1, L− c = s2
q
, p˜ = (v − c)(1− q) + c.
p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q)/(1− p2q), p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)
1− p1q (70)
The values of p1 and p2 are
p1 =
q(v − c)(1− q)− s1
q(v − c)(1− q)− qs1 , p2 =
q(v − c)(1− q)− s2
q(v − c)(1− q)− qs2 (71)
Since s1 < s2, p1 > p2. Note that pi, i = 1, 2 only depends on si. Using the values of p1 and p2, we
obtain from (70)
p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q)− s2
1− q =
s2
q(1− p2) (72)
and
p˜1 − c = (v − c)(1− q)− s1
1− q =
s1
q(1− p1) (73)
We also use the above equalities throughout this section.
It is easy to discern that ψ1,N(·) and ψ2,Y (·) are continuous. Now, we show that ψ1,Y (·) is also
continuous.
Observation 3. ψ1,Y (·) is a continuous function.
Proof: We only show that ψ1,Y (·) is continuous at p˜2, it is easy to discern that ψ1,Y (·) at other values.
Note from (72) and (70), the left hand limit is
1
p1
(1− L− c
p˜2 − c) =
1
p1
p2
Now from (70), the right hand limit and the value of ψ1,Y (·) at p˜2 is
1
qp1
(1− (v − c)(1− q)
p˜2 − c ) =
1
qp1
p2q = p2/p1
Hence, ψ1,Y (·) does not have a jump at p˜2.
Next, we show that ψ2,N(·) is continuous everywhere but at v.
Observation 4. ψ2,N(·) is continuous except at v.
Proof: Since s1 < s2, thus, it is easy to discern that ψ2,N(·) has a jump at v.
Now, we show that ψ2,N(·) does not have a jump at p˜1. It is easy to discern that ψ2,N(·) can not have
a jump at any other point.
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From (73), we have
(v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1
p˜1 − c
= [(v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1] 1− q
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 = 1− q + s2
1− q
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 (74)
Thus, the left hand limit at p˜1 is
1
q(1− p2)(1−
(v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1
p˜1 − c − p2q) = 1−
s2(1− q)
q(1− p2)[(v − c)(1− q)− s1] (75)
Now, the right hand limit and the value of ψ2,N(·) at p˜1 is
1
1− p2 (1−
L− c
p˜1 − c − p2) = 1−
s2(1− q)
q(1− p2)[(v − c)(1− q)− s1] from (73). (76)
Hence, ψ2,N(·) does not have a jump at p˜1.
Note that though ψ2,N(·) has a jump at v, the variation of ψ2,N with x is similar to the other distributions
ψ1,N(·), ψ1,Y (·) and ψ2,Y (·).
Now, we are ready to state the main result in this section.
Theorem 9. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1 and N w.p. 1− p1 and
primary 2 selects Y w.p. p2 and N w.p. 1 − p2 where p1 and p2 are given in (71). While selecting Y ,
primary i = 1, 2 selects its price according to ψi,Y (·) when the channel of primary j, j 6= i is available
and will select the price v if the channel of primary j is unavailable; while selecting N , primary i selects
its price according to ψi,N(·).
The above strategy profile is the unique NE when s2 < q(v−c)(1−q). The expected payoff that primary
1 attains is (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 and primary 2 attains is (v − c)(1− q).
Discussion: Since s2 > s1, thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is higher compared to primary 2.
Since s2 < q(v− c)(1− q), thus by Theorem 8 the expected payoff of primary 1 is lower compared to the
setting where s2 ≥ q(v− c)(1−q). Note also that the payoff of primary 1 decreases with s2, but increases
with s1. Thus, if s2 decreases it only impacts the payoff of primary 1, it does not affect the payoff of
primary 2. The payoff of primary 1 also becomes closer to the payoff of primary 2 as s2 becomes closer
to s1 and ultimately becomes equal when s2 = s1 which we have already seen in Section III where we
analyze the scenario when both the primaries have identical cost to acquire the CSI of their respective
competitors i.e. s2 = s1 = s.
p1 (p2,resp.) increases with the decrease in s1 (s2, resp.). Thus, primaries are more likely to select Y
as the cost s1, s2 decrease. When s → 0, then p1 → 1, and when s2 → 0, then p2 → 1. Since s1 < s2,
thus, p1 > p2. Primary 1 is more likely to select Y compared to primary 2.
Note that under Y , primary 1 (primary 2, resp.) selects its price from the interval [L, p˜1] ([L, p˜2],
resp.) when the channel of its competitor is available. Note that L is less than p˜ (given in (50)) as
s2 < q(v − c)(1 − q). Hence, each primary selects its price from a larger interval when both primaries
randomize between Y and N . Also note that L decreases as s2 decreases. However, L is independent of
s1. Since p˜1 > p˜2, hence, under Y primary 1 selects its price from a wider interval compared to primary
2. Also note from (72) and (73) p˜1 and p˜2 increase as s1 and s2 decrease respectively. Hence, ψi,Y (·) has
larger supports as si decreases.
ψ2,N(·) has a jump at v similar to the setting when s2 ≥ q(v − c)(1− q) but s1 < q(v − c)(1− q).
1) Proof of Theorem 9: First, we show that there is no profitable unilateral deviation for primary 1
when primary 2 follows the strategy prescribed in Theorem 9 (Case I). Subsequently, we also show that
there is no unilateral profitable deviation for primary 2 when primary 1 follows the strategy prescribed in
Theorem 9 (Case II).
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Case I: First, we show that under Y , when the channel of primary 2 is available, then the maximum
expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is L− c− s1 and it is attained at prices in the interval [L, p˜1]
(Step i). Next, we show that when the channel of primary 2 is not available, then under Y the primary 1
attains a payoff of (v− c)− s1 (by selecting price v). This shows that the maximum expected payoff that
primary 1 attains under Y is (v− c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 (Step ii). Subsequently, we show that under N , the
maximum expected payoff that a primary can attain is (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 and it is attained only at
the prices in the interval [p˜1, v) (Step iii). Finally, we show that the maximum expected payoff attained
by primary 1 is (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 and it is attained when primary 1 follows the strategy (Step iv).
(i) Suppose that primary 1 selects Y and the channel of primary 2 is available. First, we show that at
any price x ∈ [L, p˜2], the expected payoff of primary 1 in this case is L− c− s1 (Step i.a.). Subsequently,
we show that at any price x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1] the expected payoff of primary 1 is L− c− s1 (Step i.b.). Next, we
show that at any price price x ∈ [p˜1, v] the expected payoff of primary 1 is at most L− c− s1 (Step i.c.).
Note that at a price less than L will fetch a payoff of strictly less than the payoff of L−c−s1. Hence, this
will show that when the channel of primary 2 is available, then under Y the maximum expected payoff
attained by primary 1 is L− c− s1 and it is attained only at prices [L, p˜1].
Step i.a.: Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [L, p˜2]. Since the primary 2 selects a price less
than or equal to x if it selects Y and then selects a price less than or equal to x (it occurs w.p. p2ψ2,Y (x)).
Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p2ψ2,Y (x))− s1 = L− c− s1 from (67).
Step i.b.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1]. Primary 2 selects a price
less than or equal to x if it either selects Y or it selects N and then selects a price less than or equal to
x. Thus, at any price x, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)ψ2,N(x)− p2)− s1 = L− c− s1 from (69).
Thus, at any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1] fetches the primary an expected payoff of L− c− s1.
Step i.c: Now, at any price in the interval [p˜1, v) the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)ψ2,N(x)− p2)− s1
= (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1
x− c − qp2)− p2)− s1from (69)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + ((v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1)/q − s1 (77)
Since the co-efficient of (x− c) is negative, the above is maximized at x = p˜1. Now, from (73)
(p˜1 − c)(1− 1/q) = −((v − c)(1− q)− s1)/q
Thus, (77) is upper bounded by L− c− s1.
Since ψ2,N(·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 at v is strictly less than the
expected payoff at a price close to v. Thus, the maximum expected payoff attained in the interval [p˜1, v]
is s2/q − s1 = L− c− s1 (by(70)).
Thus, under Y when the channel of primary 2 is available, the maximum expected payoff of primary
1 is L− c− s1 and it is attained in every price in the interval [L, p˜1].
(ii) When the channel of primary 2 is unavailable, then the payoff of primary 1 is (v − c) − s1 as
primary 1 selects v and is still capable of selling its channel. Hence, the maximum expected payoff of
primary 1 under Y is
qs2/q + (v − c)(1− q)− s1 = (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 (78)
(iii) Now, we show that under N , the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 is at most (v − c)(1−
q) + s2 − s1 and it is attained when it follows the strategy ψ1,N(·). Toward this end, we first show that if
primary 1 selects a price in the interval [p˜1, v] the expected payoff is (v − c)(1 − q) + s2 − s1 and it is
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attained at any price in the interval [p˜1, v) (Step iii.a). Subsequently, we show that if primary 1 selects a
price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1], then the expected payoff under N is at most (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 (Step
iii.b.). Finally, we show that even if primary 1 selects a price in the interval [L, p˜2), then the expected
payoff is also at most (v − c)(1 − q) + s2 − s1 under N (Step iii.c.). Note that at any price less than L
will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than the payoff at L. Hence, this will complete the proof.
Step iii.a: Now, suppose primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v). Now, primary 2 selects a price less than
or equal to x if the channel of primary 2 is available, and one of the two things occur–(i) primary 2
selects Y , and (ii) primary 2 selects N and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs w.p. p2 and
(ii) occurs w.p. (1 − p2)ψ2,N(x). The channel of primary 2 is available w.p. q. Thus, at x, the expected
payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)qψ2,N(x)− p2q) = (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 from (69) (79)
Since ψ2,N(·) has a jump at v, hence, primary 1 attains strictly higher payoff at a price just below v
compared to the payoff at v. Hence, the expected payoff at v is strictly less than (v− c)(1− q) + s2− s1.
Step iii.b: Now, if primary 1 selects any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1], then its expected payoff is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)qψ2,N(x)− p2q) = (x− c)(1− q(1− L− c
x− c )) from (69)
= (x− c)(1− q) + [L− c]q (80)
which is maximized at x = p˜1. Now, from (73) (p˜1− c)(1− q) = (v− c)(1− q)− s1. Since (L− c)q = s2
(by (70), hence the maximum expected payoff is
(v − c)(1− q)− s1 + s2 (81)
Step iii.c: Suppose that the primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [L, p˜2). Since primary 2 does not
select any price in this interval when the channel of primary 2 is unavailable or primary 2 selects N .
Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− p2qψ2,Y (x))
= (x− c)(1− q(1− L− c
x− c )) (from (67)) = (x− c)(1− q) + (L− c)q
< (p˜1 − c)(1− q) + (L− c)q = (v − c)(1− q)− s1 + s2 (82)
Hence, under N , the maximum expected payoff that a primary can attain is (v − c)(1− q) + s2 − s1 and
this is attained at any price in the interval [p˜1, v).
(iv) Under Y or N , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is (v− c)(1− q) + s2− s1.
Thus, any randomization of Y and N also yields the same expected payoff. Under the strategy profile,
the primary 1 attains the payoff of (v− c)(1− q) + s2− s1, hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable
unilateral deviation.
Case II: We now show that primary 2 also does not have any profitable unilateral deviation. Toward
this end we first show that when primary 2 selects Y and primary 1 is available, then the maximum
expected payoff of primary 2 is L − c − s2 and it is attained at any price in the interval [L, p˜2] (Step
i). Subsequently, we show that under Y , the maximum expected attained by primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q)
and it is attained when primary 2 follows the strategy (Step ii). Subsequently, we show that under N ,
the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 attains is (v − c)(1− q) and it is attained at a price in the
interval [p˜2, v] (Step iii). Finally, we show that the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 attains is
(v − c)(1− q) and it is attained when primary 2 follows the strategy (Step iv).
Step i: Suppose that primary 2 selects Y and primary 1 is available. We show that the maximum
expected payoff that primary 2 attains is L− c− s2 and it is attained at any price in the interval [L, p˜2].
Toward this end, we first show that at any price [L, p˜2], the expected payoff is L− c− s2 (Step i.a.). At
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any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1] and [p˜1, v] the expected payoff is at most L− c− s2 (Steps i.b. and i.c.
respectively). This will complete the proof.
Step i.a.: Suppose x ∈ [L, p˜2]. Since primary 2 selects Y , primary 2 knows that primary 1 is available.
Primary 1 selects a price in the interval [L, p˜2] if primary 1 selects Y (which occurs w.p. p1). Thus, the
expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s2 = L− c− s2 from (66). (83)
Thus, the expected payoff at any price x ∈ [L, p˜2] is L− c− s2.
Step i.b.: Suppose x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1]. The expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s2 = (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− p˜− c
x− c))− s2 from (66).
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + (p˜− c)/q − s2. (84)
Since the coefficient of x is negative, the above is maximized at p˜2. Thus, the expected payoff is upper
bounded by
(p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q) + (p˜− c)/q − s2 = (p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q) + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 from (70)
= s2/q − (v − c)(1− q)/q + (v − c)(1− q)/q − s2 from (72)
= L− c− s2 since L− c = s2/q (cf.(70)). (85)
Thus, at any x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1] the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is L− c− s2.
Step i.c.: Now, suppose x ∈ [p˜1, v]. The expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)ψ1,N(x)− p1)− s2 = (x− c)(1− 1
q
(1− p˜− c
x− c − p1q)− p1)− s2 from (68)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q) + p˜− c
q
− s2
< (p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q) + p˜− c
q
− s2 since p˜2 < p˜1, = L− c− s2 from (85). (86)
Thus, from Steps i.a., i.b. and i.c. the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 in this case is
L− c− s2 and it is attained at the prices in the interval [L, p˜2].
Step ii: When primary 1 is unavailable, then primary 2 attains a payoff of v− c− s2. Hence, under Y ,
the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is
(L− c− s2)q + (v − c− s2)(1− q) = q(L− c) + (v − c)(1− q)− s2 = (v − c)(1− q) from (70).
(87)
It is attained when primary 2 follows the strategy.
Step iii: Now, we show that when primary 2 selects N , then, its maximum expected payoff is (v −
c)(1− q) and it is attained at any price in the interval [p˜2, v]. Toward this end, we show that at any price
in the intervals [p˜2, p˜1] and [p˜1, v], the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is (v − c)(1 − q) (Steps
iii.a. and iii.b.). Subsequently, we show that the maximum expected payoff attained by the primary at any
x ∈ [L, p˜2], the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q).
Step iii.a: Suppose primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1]. Since primary 2 selects N , thus, it only knows
that primary 1 is available w.p. q. Thus, at x, the expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1qψ1,Y (x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (66) (88)
Step iii.b.: Suppose primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v]. Then the expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q − (1− p1)qψ1,N(x)) = (v − c)(1− q) from (68). (89)
From Steps iii.a. and iii.b., the expected payoff of primary 2 at [p˜2, v] is (v − c)(1− q).
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Step iii.c: Now, suppose primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [L, p˜2] is
(x− c)(1− p1qψ1,Y (x)) = (x− c)(1− q) + (L− c)q from (66) (90)
The above is maximized at x = p˜2 as the coefficient of x is positive. Hence, the maximum expected
payoff of primary 2 is upper bounded by
(p˜2 − c)(1− q) + (L− c)q = (v − c)(1− q)− s2 + (L− c)q from (72).
= (v − c)(1− q) since (L− c)q = s2 from (70). (91)
Thus, the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 is (v− c)(1− q) and it is attained only at prices in the
interval x ∈ [p˜2, v] (by Steps iii.a. and iii.b.).
Step iv: By Step (ii), the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 under Y is (v− c)(1− q). From Step
(iii), the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 under N is (v − c)(1 − q). Thus, any randomization
between Y and N will yield a maximum expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q). This maximum expected
payoff is attained by primary 2 when it follows the strategy.
VI. UNEQUAL CHANNEL AVAILABILITY PROBABILITIES
We, now, consider the setting, where different primaries may have different availability probabilities
depicted in Section II-B3. Without loss of generality, we assume that the channel of primary 1 is available
w.p. q1 and the channel of primary 2 is available w.p. q2 where q1 > q2.
A. Goals
The impact of different availability probabilities on the frequency with which a primary selects Y can
not be readily concluded. If primary 1 acquires the CSI of primary 2, it will more often find that that
the channel of primary 2 is unavailable which may increase its payoff. However, primary 2 itself may
also acquire the CSI of primary 1 and select a lower price, in response primary 1 selects a lower price
which may reduce the payoff of primary 1. Even if the NE strategy is of the form [T, p], the values of
the thresholds may be different for different primaries. Additionally, it is not clear whether the threshold
will be higher for primary 1. This is because if the availability probability of primary 2 is low, primary
1 may select Y for very small values of s, but primary 2 may still select Y for larger values of s as the
channel availability probability of the primary 1 is higher.
The impact of different availability probabilities on the payoff of each primary is also not apriori clear.
Conventional wisdom suggests that as s decreases the payoff of a primary should not decrease. However,
the conventional wisdom is not definitive because of the following. Since the channel of primary 1 is
available with a higher probability, when primary 2 acquires the CSI of primary 1, then, primary 1 selects
a lower price more often which may reduce the payoff of primary 2. The pricing strategy also inherently
depends on the frequency with which a primary selects Y . We resolve all these quandaries.
B. Results
We first discuss the main insights provided by our analysis.
• The NE strategy for primary i is of the form [Ti, pi] (Definition 4). However, Ti is different for different
primaries due to different availability probabilities. Our result shows that T1 = q2(v − c)(1 − q2)
(Theorem 10) and T2 = q2(v − c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2) (Theorem 11) where T1 > T2. Note that in
the basic model, we have shown that the threshold depends on the variance of the availability of the
competitor’s channel. Thus, T1 = q2(v − c)(1 − q2) is expected. However, the expression of T2 is
surprising. Additionally, we show that T1 > T2 which is again not completely intuitive. Also note that
when T2 ≤ s < T1, primary 2 selects Y w.p. 0, but primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1. Even when s < T2,
pis are different with p1 > p2 (Theorem 12). Thus, primary 1 selects Y with a higher probability.
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• Different availability probabilities also lead to different payoffs for the primaries. In contrast to the
basic model, the expected payoff of primary 1 is higher than that of primary 2 when primary 1 selects
Y with positive probability (Theorems 11 and 12). Additionally, the expected payoff of primary 2
decreases as s decreases. Thus, the expected payoff of a primary decreases with the ease of acquiring
the CSI which negates the conventional wisdom. Intuitively, since primary 1 selects Y with a higher
probability as s decreases, it selects a lower price when the channel of primary 2 is available. In
response, primary 2 either must select a high price (so that, it can get a high payoff in the event when
the channel of primary 1 is unavailable) or select a low price (so that, it can increase its probability
of winning). Since the channel of primary 1 is available with a higher probability, the first option
fetches a lower payoff compared to the latter one. Thus, primary 2 also selects a lower price. Thus,
the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases as s decreases. The expected payoff of primary 2 becomes
close to that of primary 1 as the difference between q1 and q2 decreases.
• Price strategies also exhibit some similarities with the basic model. Specifically, primary i selects
its price from the interval [L, p˜i] ([p˜i, v], resp.) when it selects Y (N , resp.) and the channel of the
competitor is available. However, since primaries have different availability probabilities, the price
selection strategies also have some differences compared to the basic model. For example, p˜1 > p˜2.
Thus, primary 2 selects a lower price when it selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available.
Additionally, primary 1 selects v with a positive probability when it selects N and the probability
decreases as q2 becomes close to q1. Thus, primary 1 selects a price from a distribution function
which has a discontinuity whereas in the basic model, each primary selects its price from a continuous
distribution function. Intuitively, since primary 1 has higher channel availability probability, it selects
a higher price when it selects N .
C. High s
Our first result shows that
Theorem 10. If s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q2) then in the unique NE, both the primaries select N w.p. 1. The
expected payoff of both the primaries is (v − c)(1− q2)
Note that when s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q2) both the primaries attain identical expected payoff though the
availability probabilities are different.
Proof: When both players select N , then the setting becomes equivalent to the setting where primary
1 (primary 2, resp.) only knows that the channel of primary 2 (primary 1, resp.) is available w.p. q1 (q2
resp.). The above setting has already been considered in [26]. From [26],
Lemma 3. In the unique NE pricing strategy under N , primary i should select its pricing strategy using
ψi(·), where
ψ1(x) =

0 x < p¯
1
q1
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ) p¯ ≤ x < v
1 x > v
ψ2(x) =

0 x < p¯
1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ) p¯ ≤ x ≤ v
1 x > v
where p¯− c = (v − c)(1− q2). ψ1(·) has a jump of q1 − q2
q1
at v.
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It is easy to show that each primary will attain an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q2). Now, we show
that each primary can not attain higher payoff by selecting Y . First, we show that primary 1 can not attain
more by selecting Y (Step i). Subsequently, we show that primary 2 can not attain more by selecting Y
(Step ii).
Step i: Suppose that primary 1 deviates and selects Y . When the channel of primary 2 is available,
then the expected payoff of primary 1 at any [p¯, v] is
(x− c)(1− ψ2(x))− s = (x− c)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s (92)
The above is maximized at p¯ as the co-efficient of x is negative. Since p¯ − c = (v − c)(1 − q2) (from
Lemma 3), hence, the above is upper bounded by
(v − c)(1− q2)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s = p¯− c− s. (93)
The price at any x < p¯ will fetch an expected payoff of strictly less than p¯− c− s. Thus, the maximum
expected payoff that primary 1 attains in this setting is p¯− c− s.
When the channel of primary 2 is not available, then the payoff of primary 1 is (v − c) − s. Hence,
the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain by deviating unilaterally is
q2(v − c)(1− q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)− s (94)
When s ≥ q2(v−c)(1−q2), then, primary 1 will attain an expected payoff of strictly less than (v−c)(1−q2).
Hence, primary 1 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
Step ii: By applying the similar method we can show that the maximum expected payoff attained by
primary 2 under Y is
q1(v − c)(1− q2) + (v − c)(1− q1)− s (95)
However, the above is strictly less than q2(v − c)(1 − q2) + (v − c)(1 − q2) − s since q1 > q2. If
s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q2), then the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 will attain under Y is strictly
less than (v− c)(1− q2). However, primary 2 attains an expected payoff of (v− c)(1− q2) following the
strategy profile at N , hence, primary 2 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation.
D. s is neither too high nor too low
Now, we show that when
q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 ≤ s < q2(v− c)(1− q2) then there is an NE where primary
1 randomizes between Y and N , however, primary 2 only selects N . First, we introduce some price
distribution functions.
ψY (x) =0, x < L
1
p1q1
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x ≤ p˜
1, x > p˜ (96)
and
ψ1,N(x) =0, x < p˜
1
(1− p1)q1 (1−
L− c
x− c − p1q1) p˜ ≤ x < v
1, x ≥ v (97)
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ψN(x) =0, x < L
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x < p˜
1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ) p˜ ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (98)
where
L− c = s
q2
(99)
p˜− c = L− c
1− p1q1 (100)
p1 =
(v − c)(1− q2)− s/q2
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s (101)
Replacing the value of p1 from (101) in p˜ we obtain
p˜− c = (s/q2)(q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s)
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s− q1(v − c)(1− q2) + sq1/q2 =
(v − c)(1− q2)− s
(1− q2) (102)
It is easy to discern that ψY (·) is continuous. We, also, show that ψN(·) is a continuous function.
Observation 5. ψN(·) is a continuous function.
Proof: It is easy to discern that ψN(·) is continuous every except x = p˜. Now, we show that ψN(·)
is also continuous at p˜. The left hand limit of ψN(·) is 1− L− c
p˜− c . Now, the right hand limit is
1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
p˜− c ) =
1
q2
(1− (p˜− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2
p˜− c ) from (102) and (99)
= 1− L− c
p˜− c (103)
Hence, ψN(·) does not have any jump at p˜.
Now, we show that ψ1,N(·) has a jump at v.
Observation 6. ψ1,N(·) has a jump at v.
Proof: Note that s ≥ q2(v− c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2), hence, L− c
v − c ≥
1− q1
1− q1 + q2 > 1− q1 as q1 > q2
and L− c = s/q2. Thus,
1− 1
(1− p1)q1 (1−
L− c
v − c − p1q1) > 1−
1
(1− p1)q1 (1− 1 + q1 − p1q1) = 0 (104)
Hence, ψ1,N(·) has a jump at v.
Now, we are ready to state the main result.
Theorem 11. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p1 (given in (101)) and
N w.p. 1− p1 and primary 2 selects N w.p. 1. While selecting Y , primary 1 selects its price according
to ψY (·) when the channel of primary 2 is available and selects v when the channel of primary 2 is
unavailable. While selecting N , primary 1 selects its price according to ψ1,N(·). Primary 2 selects its
price according to ψN(·).
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The above strategy profile is the unique NE when q2(v−c)(1−q2) > s ≥ q2(v−c)(1−q1)/(1−q1+q2)18.
The expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1− q2) and the expected payoff of primary 2 is s/q2.
Discussion: Since s < q2(v − c)(1 − q2), hence, s/q2 < (v − c)(1 − q2). Thus, the expected payoff
of primary 2 is lower compared to the expected payoff of primary 1. The expected payoff of primary 2
decreases as s decreases. This negates conventional wisdom which suggests that the expected payoff of a
primary should increase when s decreases.
Note that the support of ψY is [L, p˜] and the support of ψN is [L, v]. Thus, the support of ψY and ψN
overlap with each other. Also note that ψ1,N(·) has a jump at v, where as ψN(·) does not have any jump.
Intuitively, since primary 1 has higher availability probability, primary 1 selects higher prices with higher
probabilities.
p1 increases with decrease in s. L decreases when s decreases (by (99)). Thus, primaries select their
prices from a larger interval as s decreases. Also note that L only depends on q2, it is independent of q1.
Also note from (102) that p˜ increases as s decreases. Thus, ψY (·) has a larger support as s decreases
and primary 1 selects its price from a larger interval when it selects Y , and the channel of primary 2 is
available.
Now, we prove the above theorem.
Proof: First, we show that primary 1 does not have any profitable deviation when primary 2 follows
the strategy prescribed in Theorem 11 (Case I). Subsequently, we show that primary 2 also does not have
any profitable unilateral deviation when primary 2 follows the strategy prescribed in Theorem 11 (Case
II).
Case I: First, we show that under Y , if the channel of primary 2 is available, then primary 1 can attain
a maximum expected payoff of L− c− s (Step i). When the channel of primary 2 is unavailable primary
1 will attain the payoff v− c− s. Thus, it shows that under Y , the expected payoff that primary 1 attains
is (v − c)(1 − q2) (Step ii). Subsequently, we show that under N , the maximum expected payoff that
primary 1 attains is (v − c)(1 − q2) (Step iii). Finally, we show that primary 1 achieves the maximum
expected payoff under the prescribed strategy (Step iv).
(i): Suppose primary 1 selects Y and the channel of primary 2 is available. The at any price x ∈ [L, p˜],
the expected payoff of primary 1 under Y is
(x− c)(1− ψN(x))− s = L− c− s from (98). (105)
At any price less than or equal to L will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than L− c− s.
At any price x in the interval [p˜, v] the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− ψN(x))− s = (x− c)(1− 1
q2
(1− (v − c)(1− q2)
x− c ))− s from (98)
= (x− c)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s
The above is maximized at p˜. Putting x = p˜, and from (102) we obtain
(v − c)(1− q2)− s
1− q2 (1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s = s/q2 − s
= L− c− s by (99) (106)
Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 1 is L − c − s and it is attained at any price
in the interval [L, p˜].
(ii): Now, when the channel of primary 2 is not available, then the payoff that primary 1 achieves under
Y is (v − c)− s. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can achieve under Y is
q2(L− c− s) + (v − c− s)(1− q2) = (v − c)(1− q2) (107)
18Note that (1− q2)(1− q1) + q2(1− q2) > (1− q1) as q2 < q1, thus, (1− q2) > 1− q1
1− q1 + q2
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By following the strategy profile, primary 1 achieves the above payoff under Y .
(iii): When primary 1 selects N , then it only knows that the channel of the primary 2 is available w.p.
q2. Thus, under N , at any price x in the interval [p˜, v] the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− q2ψN(x)) = (v − c)(1− q2) (108)
Similarly, at any price x in the interval [L, p˜], the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− q2ψN(x)) = (x− c)(1− q2(1− L− c
x− c )) from (98)
= (x− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 (109)
The above is maximized at x = p˜. Putting the value of p˜ we obtain
(p˜− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 = (p˜− c)(1− q2) + s by (99)
= (v − c)(1− q2) by (102). (110)
At any price less than L fetches a payoff of strictly less than L which is less than (v− c)(1− q2). Hence,
the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains under N is (v − c)(1− q2). This is achieved at any
price in the interval [p˜, v].
(iv): We have shown that under Y or under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain
is (v − c)(1− q2). Thus, any randomization between Y and N also yields at most an expected payoff of
(v−c)(1−q2). Primary 1 attains the above payoff when it follows the prescribed strategy. Hence, primary
1 does not have any profitable deviation.
Case II: Now, we show that primary 2 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation. Toward this
end we first show that under N , the maximum expected payoff that primary 2 attains is L − c (Step i).
Subsequently, we show that under N , the primary 2 attains the maximum expected payoff L− c when it
selects price in the interval [L, v) (Step ii). Subsequently, we show that if primary 2 deviates and selects
Y , then it can only attain a payoff of at most L− c when s ≥ q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 (Step iii).
Step (i): Suppose that primary 2 selects N . Suppose that primary 2 selects a price x in the interval [L, p˜].
If the channel of primary 1 is available, then it selects a price less than or equal to x where x ∈ [L, p˜] if
primary 1 selects Y and then selects a price less than or equal to x. The above occurs w.p. p1ψY (x). The
channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q1. Hence, by the continuity of ψ1,Y (·) at x the expected payoff of
primary 2 under N is
(x− c)(1− p1q1ψY (x)) = L− c from (96). (111)
Now, suppose that primary 2 selects a price x from the interval [p˜, v). If the channel of primary 1 is
available, then primary 1 selects a price less than or equal to x when x ∈ [p˜, v) if–i) primary 1 selects Y
or ii) primary 1 selects N and selects a price less than or equal to x. (i) occurs with probability p1 and
(ii) occurs with probability (1− p1)ψ1,N(x). The channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q1. Since ψ1,N is
continuous in [p˜, v), the expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)q1ψ1,N(x)− p1q1) = L− c from (97). (112)
Since ψ1,N(·) has a jump at v, the expected payoff at v is strictly less than the expected payoff just below
v. On the other hand a price less than L will fetch a payoff strictly less than L− c. Hence, the maximum
expected payoff that primary 2 can attain under N is L− c.
Step ii: Primary 2 attains a payoff of L − c under N and it is attained only at prices in the interval
[L, v).
Step (iii): Now, we show that if primary 2 selects Y , then it will not attain a payoff higher than s/q2.
Towards this end, we show when the channel of primary 1 is available, then the maximum expected
payoff attained by primary 2 is L− c− s (Step iii.a). When the channel of primary 1 is unavailable, then
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the payoff attained by primary 2 is v− c− s. Subsequently, we show that the maximum expected payoff
attained under Y is at most L− c when s ≥ q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 (Step iii.b.). This will complete the proof.
Step iii.a: When the channel of primary 1 is available then the expected payoff of primary 2 at any
price x in the interval [L, p˜] is
(x− c)(1− p1ψY (x))− s = (x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (L− c)/q1 − s from (96). (113)
The above is maximized at x = L since the co-efficient of x is negative, hence, the maximum value is
L− c− s.
Similarly, the expected payoff of primary 2 at any price x in the interval [p˜, v) is
(x− c)(1− (1− p1)ψ1,N(x)− p1)− s = (x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (L− c)/q1 − s from (97)
< (L− c)− s since p˜ > L. (114)
The payoff at a price less than L fetches a payoff which is strictly less than L− c− s.
Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 when the channel of primary 1 is available
is L− c− s.
Step iii.b: When the channel of primary 1 is unavailable, then the payoff that primary 2 attains is
(v − c)− s. Hence, the expected payoff of primary 2 under Y is
q1(L− c− s) + (v − c− s)(1− q1) = q1s
q2
+ (v − c)(1− q1)− s
= (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)
q2
≤ s/q2 as q2(v − c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2) ≤ s
= L− c (115)
But primary 2 attains L − c under N following the strategy ψN(·). Thus, primary 2 does not have any
profitable unilateral deviation. Hence, the result follows.
E. Low s
Now, we show that when s <
q2(v − c)(1− q1)
1− q1 + q2 then there exists an NE where both the primaries
randomize between Y and N . Again we first introduce some pricing distributions.
ψ1,Y (x) =0, x < L
1
p1
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x < p˜2
1
p1q1
(1− p¯− c
x− c) p˜2 ≤ x ≤ p˜1
1, x > p˜1 (116)
ψ2,Y (x) =0, x < L
1
p2
(1− L− c
x− c ) L ≤ x ≤ p˜2
1, x > p˜2 (117)
ψ1,N(x) =0, x < p˜1
1
(1− p1)q1 (1−
p¯− c
x− c − p1q1) p˜1 ≤ x < v
1, x ≥ v (118)
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ψ2,N(x) =0, x < p˜2
1
1− p2 (1−
L− c
x− c − p2), p˜2 ≤ x < p˜1
1
(1− p2)q2 (1−
(v − c)(1− q2)
x− c − p2q2) p˜1 ≤ x ≤ v
1, x > v (119)
where
p¯− c = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 (120)
p1 =
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− s(q1/q2 − q1 + q2)
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s (121)
p2 =
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− s(1− q1 + q2)
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s (122)
L− c = s/q2
p˜2 − c = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
1− p2q1 , p˜1 − c =
(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
1− p1q1 (123)
First, we show some results which we use throughout this section. Replacing the value of p2 in p˜2 we
have
p˜2 − c = [q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s][(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2]
q2(v − c)(1− q1)2 + s(q1 − q21 + q1q2 − q2)
=
[q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s][(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2]
q2(v − c)(1− q1)2 + sq2(1− q1)(q1 − q2)/q2 =
(v − c)(1− q1)− s
(1− q1) (124)
L− c
1− p2 =
s
q2(1− p2) =
((v − c)(1− q1)− s)s
s(1− q1)
=
(v − c)(1− q1)− s
1− q1 = p˜2 − c (125)
Also note from (123) and (121) that
p˜1 − c = [(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2][q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s]
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− sq1 − q21(v − c)(1− q2) + sq21/q2 − sq21 + sq1q2
=
[(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2][q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s]
q1(1− q2)[(v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2] =
(v − c)(1− q2)− s
1− q2 (126)
ψ1,Y (·), ψ2,Y (·) and ψ2,N(·) are continuous. However, ψ1,N(·) is not continuous.
Observation 7. ψ1,N(·) is continuous except at v.
Proof: It is easy to discern the continuity at every other point except v. Note from (118) ψ1,N(·) has
a jump of
s(q1 − q2)
(v − c)(1− p1)q1q2 at v.
Observation 8. ψ1,Y (·) is continuous.
Proof: It is easy to verify that ψ1,Y (·) (cf. (116)) is continuous everywhere except at p˜2. We now
show that it is also continuous at p˜2. The left hand limit at p˜2 is
1
p1
(1− L− c
p˜2 − c) =
1
p1
(1− (1− p2)) from (125)
=
p2
p1
(127)
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The right hand limit (cf.(116)) is
1
p1q1
(1− p¯− c
p˜2 − c) =
1
p1q1
(1− 1 + p2q1) from (123)
=
p2
p1
(128)
which is equal to the left hand limit.
Observation 9. ψ2,N(·) is continuous.
Proof: It is easy to verify that ψ2,N(·) (cf. (119)) is continuous everywhere except at p˜1. Now, we
also show that ψ2,N(·) is continuous at p˜1. First note from (126) that
(v − c)(1− q2)
(1− q2)(p˜1 − c) = 1 +
s
(1− q2)(p˜1 − c) (129)
The right hand limit at p˜1 is
1
(1− p2)q2 (1−
(v − c)(1− q2)
p˜1 − c − p2q2) =
1
(1− p2)q2 (1− (1− q2)−
s
p˜1 − c − p2q2) from (129)
= 1− s
(1− p2)q2(p˜1 − c) = 1−
L− c
(1− p2)(p˜1 − c) since L− c = s/q2
=
1
(1− p2)(1−
L− c
p˜1 − c − p2) (130)
which is the left hand limit (cf.(119)). Hence, the result follows.
Note from (121) and (122) that pi i = 1, 2 both depend on q1 and q2. Next, we show that p1 > p2.
Lemma 4. p1 > p2 when q1 > q2.
Proof: From (121) and (122), we need to show that
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− s(q1/q2 − q1 + q2)
q1(v − c)(1− q2)− q1s >
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− s(1− q1 + q2)
q2(v − c)(1− q1)− q2s (131)
By cross multiplication it is sufficient to show that
q1q2(v − c)2(1− q2)(1− q1)− q1q2s(v − c)(1− q2)− s(q1/q2 − q1 + q2)q2(v − c)(1− q1)+
q2s
2(q1/q2 − q1 + q2) > q1q2(v − c)2(1− q1)(1− q2)− q1q2(v − c)(1− q1)s−
s(1− q1 + q2)q1(v − c)(1− q2) + s2(1− q1 + q2)q1.
Or,(v − c)sq1q2(q2 − q1)− s(v − c)[(q1 − q1q2 + q22)(1− q1)− (q1 − q21 + q1q2)(1− q2)]
+ s2(q22 − q1q2 − q1q2 + q21) > 0
The last expression is s2(q1 − q2)2 which is always positive when q1 > q2. Thus, it is sufficient to show
that
(v − c)sq1q2(q2 − q1)−
s(v − c)[q1 − q1q2 + q22 − q21 + q21q2 − q1q22 − q1 + q21 − q1q2 + q1q2 − q21q2 + q1q22] > 0
Or, (v − c)sq1q2(q2 − q1)− s(v − c)[q22 − q1q2] > 0
(v − c)s(q1 − q2)(q2 − q1q2) > 0 (132)
as q1 > q2, the above expression is indeed positive. Hence, the result follows.
Now, we are ready to state the main result of this section.
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Theorem 12. Consider the following strategy profile: Primary i selects Y w.p. pi (cf. (121)& (122))and
N w.p. 1− pi. While selecting Y , primary i = 1, 2 selects its price according to ψi,Y (·) when the channel
of primary j 6= i is available and selects v when the channel of primary j is unavailable. While selecting
N , primary i selects its price according to ψi,N(·).
The above strategy profile is an NE when s < q2(v − c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2). The expected payoff of
primary 1 is (v − c)(1− q2) and the expected payoff of primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2.
Discussion: Since p1 > p2 (by Lemma 4), primary 2 selects Y with a lower probability compared to
primary 1. Both p1 and p2 increase as s decreases. Both p1 and p2 go to 1 as s→ 0. Note that threshold
Ti above which primary i selects only N is higher for primary 1 i.e. T1 > T2. Hence, primary 1 selects
Y for a wider value of s.
Note that the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases with the cost of acquiring the CSI s. This negates
conventional wisdom which suggests that the expected payoff of a primary should increase as s decreases.
The expected payoff of primary 1 is independent of s. The expected payoff of primary 2 is lower than
that of primary 1. The expected payoff of primary 2 becomes equal to that of the primary 1 when q2
becomes equal to q1.
Note that ψ1,N(·) (see (118)) has a jump at v since q1 > q2. The jump decreases as the difference
between q1 and q2 decreases. Since primary 1 has a higher availability probability, thus, it selects higher
prices when it selects N . ψ1,N(·) is continuous elsewhere. It is easy to show that ψ1,Y , ψ2,Y and ψ2,N are
continuous everywhere. Note that L decreases as s decreases. Thus, a primary selects its price from a
larger interval as s decreases. p˜1 and p˜2 both decrease with s (from (124) and (126)). Hence, ψ1,Y (·) and
ψ2,Y (·) have larger supports when s decreases.
1) Proof of Theorem 12: First, we show that primary 1 does not have any profitable unilateral deviation
when primary 2 follows the strategy prescribed in the theorem (Case I). Subsequently, we show that primary
2 also does not have any profitable unilateral deviation when primary 1 follows the strategy prescribed in
the theorem (Case II).
Case I: First, we show that under Y , the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is
(v− c)(1− q2) (Step i). Toward this end, we first show that when primary 1 selects Y and the channel of
the primary 2 is available, then the expected payoff that primary 1 will attain is at most L− c− s (Step
i.a.). When primary 1 selects Y and the channel of the primary 2 is unavailable, then the payoff of the
primary 1 is v − c − s which will in turn show that the maximum payoff attained by primary 1 under
Y is (v − c)(1− q2) (Step i.b). Subsequently, we show that under N , the maximum expected payoff that
primary 1 can attain is (v − c)(1− q2) (Step ii). Finally, we show that the maximum expected payoff is
attained by primary 1 when it follows the strategy profile (Step iii).
Step i.a: Suppose that primary 1 selects Y and the channel of primary 2 is available. Then, at any price
x in the interval [L, p˜2], the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p2ψ2,Y (x))− s = L− c− s from (117) (133)
Now suppose that primary 1 selects a price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1]. Primary 2 selects a price less than or
equal to x if (i) primary 2 selects Y which occurs w.p. p2 and (ii) primary 2 selects N and then selects
a price less than or equal to x which occurs w.p. (1− p2)ψ2,N(x). Thus, by the continuity of ψ2,N(·) the
expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
(x− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)ψ2,N(x))− s = L− c− s from (119). (134)
Similarly, when primary 1 selects a price x from the interval [p˜1, v], then its expected payoff is
(x− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)ψ2,N(x))− s = (x− c)(1− 1
q2
) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s from (119). (135)
Thus, the above is maximized at p˜1 since the coefficient of x is negative. Hence, the maximum value is
(p˜1 − c)(1− 1/q2) + (v − c)(1− q2)/q2 − s
= (p˜1 − c)(1− 1/q2) + (p˜1 − c)(1− q2)/q2 + s/q2 − s (from (126)) = L− c− s from (123).
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Any price which is strictly less than L will fetch a payoff of less than L− c− s. Hence, the maximum
expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is L− c− s when the channel of primary 2 is available and it
is achieved at any price in the interval [L, p˜1].
Step i.b.: Note that the payoff that primary 1 attains when the channel of primary 2 is unavailable is
(v − c)− s. Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 attains under Y is
(L− c− s)q2 + (v − c− s)(1− q2) = (v − c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 − s
= (v − c)(1− q2) from (123). (136)
Step ii: Now, we show that if primary 1 selects N , then, it will attain a maximum expected payoff of
(v− c)(1− q2) and it is attained when it selects a price from the interval [p˜1, v]. Towards this end, we first
show that when primary 1 selects a price in the interval [p˜1, v], then its expected payoff is (v− c)(1− q2)
(Step ii.a.). Subsequently, we show that when primary 1 selects a price from the interval [p˜2, p˜1], then its
expected payoff is at most (v − c)(1− q2) (Step ii.b.). Finally, we show that if primary 1 selects a price
in the interval [L, p˜2], then its expected payoff is less than (v − c)(1− q2) (Step ii.c.). Note that a price
which is strictly less than L will fetch a payoff which is strictly less than the payoff at L, hence, this will
show that under N the expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1− q2) and it is attained when at prices
in the interval [p˜1, v].
Step ii.a: Suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v]. Primary 2 selects a price less than or equal
to x if the channel of primary 2 is available and either primary 2 selects Y or it selects N and then selects
a price less than or equal to x. Thus, the probability that primary 2 selects a price less than or equal to
x is p2q2 + (1− p2)q2ψ2,N(x). Thus, by the continuity of ψ2,N(·), the expected payoff at x is
(x− c)(1− (1− p2)q2ψ2,N(x)− p2q2) = (v − c)(1− q2) from (119). (137)
Step ii. b.: Similarly, at price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1], the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p2q2 − (1− p2)q2ψ2,N(x)) = (x− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 (138)
The above is maximized at p˜1. From (123) L− c = s/q2, thus, the maximum value is
(p˜1 − c)(1− q2) + s = (v − c)(1− q2) from (126) (139)
Step ii.c.: Now, suppose that primary 1 selects a price x ∈ [L, p˜2]. Primary 2 does not select a price in
this interval if it selects N . Hence, at x, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p2q2ψ2,Y (x)) = (x− c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 from (117)
< (p˜1 − c)(1− q2) + (L− c)q2 as p˜1 > p˜2
= (v − c)(1− q2) from (126) and (123). (140)
Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain under N is (v − c)(1 − q2) and this is
attained at every price in the interval [p˜1, v].
Step iii: The maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is (v − c)(1− q2) either under Y or
N . Hence, any randomization between Y and N will also yield the same expected payoff. The maximum
expected payoff is attained by primary 1 when it follows the strategy profile. Hence, primary 1 does not
have any profitable unilateral deviation.
Case II: We,now, show that primary 2 also does not have any profitable unilateral deviation. Toward
this end, we first show that when primary 2 selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available, then the
maximum expected payoff that it can get is L− c− s (Step i). When primary 2 selects Y and the channel
of the primary 1 is unavailable, then the payoff of primary 2 is (v − c− s). Subsequently, we show that
under Y , the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v− c)(1− q1) + s(q1− q2)/q2 (Step ii).
Subsequently, we show that when primary 2 selects N then, the maximum expected payoff that primary
2 can get is also (v− c)(1− q1) + s(q1− q2)/q2 (Step iii). Finally, we show that primary 2 can attain the
maximum expected payoff when it follows the strategy profile (Step iii).
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Step i: Suppose primary 2 selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available.
Primary 1 does not select a price from the interval [L, p˜2] when it selects N . Thus, at price x in the
interval [L, p˜2], the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s = L− c− s from (116) (141)
At price x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1], the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− p1ψ1,Y (x))− s =
(x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
q1
− s from (116)&(120). (142)
Since the co-efficient of x is negative, the above is maximized at x = p˜2. From (123) note that (v−c)(1−
q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 = (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1). Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 is upper bounded by
(p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q1) + (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1)/q1 − s = (p˜2 − c)(1− p2)− s = L− c− s from (125) (143)
Now, suppose that primary 2 selects a price x ∈ [p˜1, v). At x, the expected payoff of primary 2 is
(x− c)(1− p1 − (1− p1)ψ1,N(x))− s
= (x− c)(1− 1/q1) + (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
q1
− s from (118)&(120)
< (p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q1) + (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2
q1
− s since p˜2 < p˜1. (144)
Note from (123) that (v− c)(1− q1) + s(q1− q2)/q2 = (p˜2− c)(1− p2q1), thus, the above can be written
as
(p˜2 − c)(1− 1/q1) + (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1)/q1 − s = L− c− s from (143). (145)
Since ψ1,N(·) has a jump at v, thus, the expected payoff at v is strictly lower compared to a price close
to v. Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 at v is strictly less than L− c− s. Similarly, a price which
is strictly less than L fetches a payoff of at most L− c− s under Y .
Hence, when the channel of primary 1 is available, then, under Y the maximum expected payoff that
primary 2 can attain is L− c− s. It is attained at any price in the interval [L, p˜2].
Step ii: When the channel of primary 1 is unavailable, then the payoff that primary 2 attains is (v−c−s).
Hence, the maximum expected payoff of primary 2 under Y is
q1(L− c− s) + (1− q1)(v − c− s) = (v − c)(1− q1) + (L− c)q1 − s
= (v − c)(1− q1) + q1s/q2 − s = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 since L− c = s/q2.
Step iii: Now, we show that if primary 2 selects N , then the maximum expected payoff attained by
primary 2 is (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2. Toward this end, we first show that the maximum expected
payoff attained by primary 2 at any price in the interval [p˜2, p˜1] and [p˜1, v] is (v−c)(1−q1)+s(q1−q2)/q2
and the maximum expected payoff is attained at any price in the interval [p˜2, v) (Step iii.a. and Step iii.b.
resp.). Subsequently, we show that if primary 2 selects any price less than p˜2, then the maximum expected
payoff is at most (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 (Step iii.c.).
Step iii.a: Suppose that primary 2 selects a price x in the interval [p˜2, p˜1]. Primary 1 selects a price
less than or equal to x ∈ [p˜2, p˜1] if the channel of primary 1 is available, it selects Y and a price which
is less than or equal to x. Thus, primary 1 selects a price less than or equal to x w.p. p1q1ψ1,Y (x). Since
ψ1,Y (·) is continuous in [p˜2, p˜1], the expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q1ψ1,Y (x)) = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 from (116)&(120). (146)
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Fig. 13: Variation of pi, i = 1, 2 with
S for an example setting: v = 25, c =
0, q1 = 0.7, q2 = 0.4.
Fig. 14: Variation of the expected
payoffs of primaries with s in the same
example setting considered in Fig. 13.
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Fig. 15: Variation of p1 and p2
with q1 and q2. In the left hand
figure we use q1 = 0.6, c =
0, v = 50, s = 4 and for the right
hand figure we use q2 = 0.4, v =
50, c = 0, s = 4.
Step iii.b: Now suppose primary 1 selects a price x from the interval [p˜1, v). Primary 1 selects a price
less than or equal to x w.p. p1q1 + (1− p1)q1ψ1,N(x). Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q1 − (1− p1)q1ψ1,N(x)) = (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 from (118)&(120). (147)
to primary 2. The expected payoff at v is strictly less than the expected payoff at a price just below v since
ψ1,N(·) has a jump at v. Thus, the expected payoff at v is strictly less than (v− c)(1− q1) +s(q1− q2)/q2.
Step iii.c: Now suppose that primary 2 selects a price x from the interval [L, p˜2]. Primary 1 selects a
price in the interval only when it selects Y . Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 at x is
(x− c)(1− p1q1ψ1,Y (x)) = (x− c)(1− q1) + (L− c)q1 from (116) (148)
Since the co-efficient of x is positive, the above is maximized at x = p˜2. By (125) L−c = (1−p2)(p˜2−c).
Hence, the maximum value is
(p˜2 − c)(1− q1) + (p˜2 − c)(1− p2)q1 = (p˜2 − c)(1− p2q1)
= (v − c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 from (123). (149)
On the other hand a price which is strictly less than L fetches a payoff which is strictly less than the
payoff at L as L is the lowest end-point of the support of primary 1. Thus, under N , the maximum
expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v− c)(1− q1) + s(q1 − q2)/q2 and it is attained at any price in
the interval [p˜2, v).
Step iv: Hence, the maximum expected payoff attained by primary 2 is (v−c)(1−q1)+s(q1−q2)/q2 and
it is attained if primary 2 follows the strategy profile. Thus, primary 2 also does not have any profitable
unilateral deviation. Hence, the result follows.
F. Numerical Results
Fig. 13 shows the variation of pi, the probability with which primary i selects Y . As S increases, pis
decrease. Additionally, p1 > p2 when 0 < s < q2(v − c)(1 − q2), when s ≥ q2(v − c)(1 − q2) both the
primaries select N w.p. 1 and thus, pi = 0. When s = 0, then pi = 1. When s ≥ q2(v−c)(1−q1)/(1−q1+
q2) p2 is also 0 but p1 is positive. p1 decreases at a slower rate compared to the p2. The difference between
p1 and p2 is maximum at s = q2(v− c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2). When s ≥ q2(v− c)(1− q1)/(1− q1 + q2),
p1 decreases at a faster rate.
Fig. 14 shows the variation of the expected payoffs of the primaries with s, the cost of acquiring the
CSI. The expected payoff of primary 1 is independent of s. However, the expected payoff of primary 2
decreases as s when s < q2(v− c)(1− q2). Thus, as s decreases the payoff of primary 2 decreases which
contradicts the conventional wisdom which suggests that the payoff of a primary should increase as s
decreases.
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Fig. 16: The variation of relative gain with n for v = 50, s =
1.5, q = 0.6, no.of secondaries= q(n− 2).
Fig. 17: Variation of the expected payoff under the strategy
profile SPn as a function of s when v = 50, c = 0, n = 10,
no. of secondaries= 6. UN is the expected payoff in the setting
where the primaries can not acquire the C-CSI.
Fig. 15 shows the variations of pi, i = 1, 2 with qi, i = 1, 2. Note from the left hand figure of Fig. 15 that
when q2 is low, both the primaries select N w.p. 1, thus, pi = 0. When q2 > 0.25, p1 becomes positive,
but p2 is 0. Due to high q1, primary 1 selects Y with a higher probability and gains more compared
to primary 2. When q2 > 0.4, p2 becomes positive and the difference between p1 and p2 decreases. As
q2 becomes close to q1, primary 2 also selects Y with a higher probability. Eventually, when q2 → q1,
p2 → p1.
Note from the right hand figure of Fig. 15 that when q1 = q2, p1 = p2. As q1 increases p2 decreases
and eventually it becomes 0. Note that p1 initially increases with q1. In this regime p2 decreases, however,
q1 is not so high, thus, primary 1 can gain more by selecting Y , hence, p1 increases. However, eventually
p2 becomes 0 and q1 is high, thus, p1 decreases.
VII. GENERALIZATION
A. More than two primaries
Consider that there are n > 2 primaries. The availabilities are assumed to be the same. We briefly study
two settings–
1) Primary acquires the C-CSI of only one of the competitors: In this scenario, we consider that the
primary can acquire the C-CSI of at most one of its competitors. If the primary decides to acquire the
C-CSI, then it will acquire the C-CSI of a randomly selected competitor. First, we will describe a strategy
and later numerically we show that such a strategy is asymptotically a NE as the number of primaries
becomes large. The cost of acquiring the C-CSI(s) is assumed to be the same (s) for each primary.
Strategy Profile (SPn): When s ≥ T , each primary selects N w.p. 1 and randomizes its price according
to a distribution ψ(·) which is of the form φ1(·) (cf. (??)) from an interval [L, v]. When s < T , each
primary selects Y w.p. p (and thus, N w.p. 1−p). When a primary selects Y and the channel state of the
selected primary is 1, then, it selects its price from the interval [L1, LN ] using ψ1,Y (·); when the primary
selects N , then it selects its price from the interval [LN , L0] using ψN(·) and when the primary selects Y
and the channel state of the selected primary turns out to be 0, then it selects its price from the interval
[L0, v] using ψ0,Y (·). ψ1,Y , ψ0,Y and ψN are of the form φ1(·) (cf.(??)).
The full characterization of the strategy profiles, the threshold T and the supports are given in [35].
Note that the strategy SPn belongs to the class [T, p] (Definition 4). Note also that the primary selects
lower (higher,resp.) prices when it finds that the channel state of the selected primary is 1 (0, resp.) in
the strategy profile SPn.
We show the variation of relative gain i.e.
Ubest − Ustrategy
Ustrategy
as n increases in Fig. 16. Ubest is the
best possible expected payoff that a primary can attain. Ustrategy is the expected payoff that a primary
attains when it follows the strategy SPn. Fig. 16 shows that as n increases, the relative gain decreases
exponentially and becomes close to 0 when n ≥ 25. The relative gain is small (0.1) even when n = 10,
thus, the strategy profile SPn closely approximates the NE strategy even for small values of n
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Fig. 17 shows the variation of expected payoff as s increases under the strategy profile SPn. When
s is high, the primaries do not acquire the C-CSI, thus their expected payoffs are equal to the payoffs
they would get in the setting where the primaries can not acquire the C-CSI (UN ). The expected payoff
of the primary increases as s decreases. Note that we observe the similar behavior when there is an
estimation error (Theorems 5 and 6). However, such a similarity is not surprising. When a primary only
acquires the C-CSI of a randomly selected competitor, it is still not aware of the channel states of all the
competitors. It only has an estimate of how many competitors will be there. Simlarly, when there is an
error in estimating the C-CSI, the primary is still not certain whether the competitor is available when
there are two primaries. Thus, the expected payoff shows similarity with the setting with two primaries
and a non-zero estimation error.
2) Primary acquires the C-CSI of all the competitors: Now, we consider other extreme where if a
primary decides to acquire the C-CSI, it will aquire the C-CSI of all of its competitors. If a primary
selects N , then it will not acquire the C-CSI of any of its competitors. The C-CSI acquisition costs and
the availability probabilities are the same. We show in Appendix B that
Theorem 13. In a symmetric NE, the expected payoff of primaries are independent of the C-CSI acquisition
costs.
Note that, we have seen the similar results when there are two primaries (Theorems 3 and 4). Hence,
the result where the expected payoff of each primary is independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost extends
to a more general sceanrio where there are more than two primaries.
B. Relaxation of 0− 1 assumption of the channel state
Suppose that the available channel is one of the two states high qualiy (state 2) and low quality state
(state 1). Thus, the states of the channel of each primary is 0 (unavailable), 1 (available, but low quality)
and 2 (available and high quality). We assume that there are two primaries and the C-CSI acquisition
costs are the same. The channel of each primary is in state i, i = 0, 1, 2 w.p. qi independent of the channel
states of other primaries. All these are common information.
Since the available channel state can be in more than one state, we define a penalty function to capture
the preference order of the secondaries among available channels. The secondary will prefer a channel
with a lower penalty. Higher prices and lower qualities induce higher penalties. Hence, we consider at
state i the penalty function gi for price x is gi(x) = x− h(i) where h(·) is a strictly increasing function.
Note that negative of gi(·) can be considered to be a utility function, and quasi-linear utility functions
similar to our approach is a standard assumption in literature. We have already characterized the NE
strategy for such penalty functions when the primary can not acquire the C-CSI of its competitors [27],
[33]. Our result shows that–
Lemma 5. In the complete information game, i.e., when the primaries know the C-CSI of each others,
then the expected payoff is exactly same as the expected payoff attained by the primary in the scneario
where primaries can not acquire the C-CSI of their competitotrs.
Outline of the Proof First, we determine the expected payoff in the complete information game.
If the channel states of both the primaries are the same, it becomes the standardBertrand Competition.
Hence, the payoffs of both the players will be 0.
Now, suppose that one primary’s channel state is 2 and the other hass 1. Without loss of generality,
assume that the channel state of primary 1 is 2 and that of primary 2 is 1. This is similar to the Bertrand-
Edgworth competition and the payoff of the primary 1 (which has channel state 2 ) is h(2) and that of
primary 2 (which has channel state 1) is 0.
When only one primary is available it will select the price v+h(i) at channel state i( i ≥ 1) and attains
the monopoly profit v − c+ h(i). The probability that a primary is in state 0 is 1− q1 − q2.
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Thus, if the primary’s channel state is 2, then its expected payoff is
(v + h(2)− c)(1− q1 − q2) + (h(2)− h(1))q1 = (v − c)(1− q1 − q2) + h(2)(1− q2)− h(1)q1. (150)
When the primary is in state 1, it can only gain positive payoff only when the competitor’s channel is in
state 0. Hence, its expected payoff is
(v + h(1)− c)(1− q1 − q2). (151)
Now, in the incomplete information game, from [27], [33], [36] at channel state 1, the expected payoff
of a primary is (v + h(1)− c)(1− q1 − q2). The expected payoff of primary 2 is (L− c)(1− q2), where
L is
(L− c+ h(1))(1− q2) = (v − c+ h(1))(1− q1 − q2). (152)
Thus,
(L− c+ h(2))(1− q2) = (v − c)(1− q1 − q2) + h(2)(1− q2)− h1q1 (153)
which is also the expected payoff of a primay whose channel state is 2 in the complete information game.
Hence, the result follows.
The above proof also shows that a primary never selects Y w.p. 1 for any positive cost s > 0,the
result that we observe throughout the paper in each setting. Though the above result states that in the
two extremes the expected payoff of a primary is the same, we conjecture that the expected payoff of a
primary would be independent of the C-CSI acquisition similar to the basic model which we have studied.
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APPENDIX
A. Uniqueness Proofs of Theorems 3 and 4
Here, we show that there can not be any other NE strategy profile apart from those described in
Theorems 3 and 4 in the basic model. Note that when s ≥ q(v − c)(1− q), then the NE strategy profile
is the one described in Theorem 3 and when s < q(v − c)(1 − q), the NE strategy profile is the one
described in Theorem 4.
1) Structure of the Pricing strategies: We first investigate the key structure of the NE pricing strategies
(if it exists).
Note that under Y , if a primary knows that its competitor’s channel is not available then it will choose
v w.p. 1. We thus, investigate the structure of F1(·) and F (·) in an NE strategy. Recall that F1(·) is the
pricing distribution that a primary chooses when it selects Y and knows that the channel of its competitor
is available, while F (·) is the pricing distribution that a primary chooses when it selects N .
Theorem 14. In an NE strategy profile, neither F (·) nor F1(·) can have a jump at any price which is
less than v. Additionally, F1(·) can not have a jump at v.
Proof: First, we show that neither F (·) nor F1(·) can have a jump at any price which is less than v.
Subsequently, we show that F1(·) can not have a jump at v.
Note that a primary can only have a jump at a price if it is a best response. First, note that F (·) can not
have a jump at a price less than or equal to c. This is because at a price less than or equal to c will fetch
a negative profit, however, if the primary selects v, then it will get an expected payoff of (v − c)(1− q).
Similarly, if F1(·) has a jump at a price less than or equal to c, then its payoff under F1(·) is at most
(c−c)−s = −s. Note that when the channel of the competitor is unavailable, then the primary will attain
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the payoff of (v−c)−s. Hence, the expected payoff under Y is thus, (v−c−s)(1−q)−sq = (v−c)(1−q)−s.
However, if the primary selects N and the price v which will fetch an expected profit of (v − c)(1− q).
Now if either F1(·) or F (·) has a jump at c < x < v, then the other primary can select a price x − 
and still can gain higher payoff compared to x. Thus, the other primary will not select any price in the
interval (x− , x+ ) as it will get a strictly higher payoff at x−  compared to any price in the interval.
Hence, the primary itself can gain strictly higher payoff by selecting a price at y ∈ (x, x + ) compared
to x. It contradicts the fact that either F1(·) or F (·) will have a jump at x < v.
Next, we show that F1(·) can not have a jump at v. Suppose F1(·) has a jump at v, then the other
primary will never select v with positive probability when its channel is available as it can get strictly
higher payoff by selecting a price slightly less than v. Thus, at v, the primary is never going to sell its
channel when the channel of other primary is available. Thus, the expected payoff that the primary will
get under F1(·) is −s. Thus, under Y , the expected payoff that the primary will attain is (v−c)(1−q)−s.
Again, the primary will have an incentive to deviate to select N and select the price v which will fetch
a payoff of at least (v − c)(1− q).
The above theorem shows that if the channel of a primary is available then it can not have a jump at
any price other than v.
Now, we show an important property of F1(·) and F (·) when a primary randomizes between Y and N
in an NE strategy.
Theorem 15. Suppose that primary 1 selects Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1− p in an NE. Then, the upper end
point of the support set of F1(·) must be lower than or equal to to the lower end-point of the support set
of F (·).
Proof: Note from Theorem 14 that F1(·) can not have a jump at v. Thus, the lower end point of F1(·)
can never be v. If the lower end-point of the support set of F (·) is v, then the statement is trivially true.
So, we consider the setting where the lower end-point of the support set of F (·) is less than v. Suppose
the statement is false. Thus, there must exist a x < y < v such that x is in the support set of F (·) and
y is in the support set of F1(·). Now, suppose that the maximum expected payoff of primary 1 when it
selects F1(·) under Y is p¯1. Also let p¯2 be the maximum expected payoff primary 1 gets when it selects
F (·) under N .
Since x < v, thus, if the channel of competitor is available, it can not have any jump at x. Hence,
while choosing N , the probability of winning at x is (1 − qφ2(x)) where φ2(·) is the probability that
the primary 2 will select a price less than or equal to x when its channel is available. Since x < v and
primary 2 does not have a jump at x, thus, x is a best response to primary 1 under N . Thus,
(x− c)(1− qφ2(x)) = p¯2 (154)
Since p¯1 is the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 gets under F1(·), thus, if primary 1 selects x
under F1(·), then its payoff would be
(x− c)(1− φ2(x)) ≤ p¯1
1− φ2(x)
1− qφ2(x) ≤
p¯1
p¯2
from (154) (155)
Similarly, since y < v, thus, primary 2 will not have a jump at y when its channel is available. Thus,
primary 1’s expected payoff under F1(·) at the price y is
(y − c)(1− φ2(y)) = p¯1 (156)
If primary 1 selects N and the price y, then its expected payoff is
(y − c)(1− qφ2(y)) = p¯11− qφ2(y)
1− φ2(y) from (156)
≥ (1− qφ2(y))(1− φ2(x))
(1− φ2(y))(1− qφ2(x)) p¯2from (155) (157)
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Now, note that φ2(y) ≥ φ2(x) as y > x. If φ2(y) = φ2(x), then the expected payoff at y must be greater
than the expected payoff at x, hence, x can not be a best response at N for primary 1. However, if
φ2(y) > φ2(x), then the expected payoff at y at N is strictly higher than p¯2 by (157). Thus, this leads to
a contradiction since p¯2 is the maximum expected payoff at N . Hence, the result follows.
Now, we show that both F (·) and F1(·) are contiguous. Additionally, if a primary randomizes between
Y and N , then there is no “gap” between F (·) and F1(·).
Theorem 16. (i) In a NE strategy if a primary selects Y w.p. 1, and it selects F1(·) when it knows that
the channel of other primary is available, then F1(·) must be contiguous and the upper end-point of F1(·)
must be v.
(ii) In a NE strategy if a primary selects N w.p. 1, and if it selects F (·) when it knows that channel of
other primary is available, then F (·) must be contiguous and the upper end-point of F (·) must be v.
(iii) In a NE strategy if the primary randomizes between Y and N , both F1(·) and F (·) must be contiguous,
there must not be any gap between the support sets of F1(·) and F (·). Moreover, the upper-end point of
F (·) must be v.
Proof: We only show the proof of part (i). The proof of the other parts will be similar.
Part (i): Suppose that primary 1 selects F1(·) such that F1(x) = F1(y) for some v ≥ y > x such that
both y, x are under the support set of F1(·). Since x < v thus, primary 2 does not have a jump at x
when its channel is available. Hence, x is a best response for primary 1 under F1(·). By Theorem 15 if
a primary randomizes between Y and N , then the lower end-point of F (·) must be greater than or equal
to the lower end-point of F1(·). Thus, F (x) = F (y) = 0. Thus, primary 2 will attain a strictly higher
payoff at any value z ∈ (x, y) compared to at x. Thus, there is an  > 0 where primary 2 will never select
any price in the interval [x, x + ], hence, x itself is not a best response for primary 1. But the above
contradicts the fact that x is in the support set of F1(·). Hence, the result follows.
2) Special Property where primaries randomize between Y and N : Next theorem shows that in an NE
if both the primaries randomize between Y and N . Then both of them should put the same probability
mass on Y (and N , resp.).
Theorem 17. Suppose primary 1 selects Y w.p. 1 > p1 > 0 and N w.p. 1− p1. Primary 2 selects Y w.p.
1 > p2 > 1 and N w.p. 1− p2. Then, p1 = p2 in an NE strategy profile.
Proof: Suppose that at Y , primary 1 (2, resp.) selects a price using the distribution F1(·) (F¯1(·), resp.)
when it knows that the channel of primary 2 (1, resp.) is available for sale. At N , suppose that primary
1 (2, resp.) selects a price using the distribution F (·) (F¯ (·), resp.).
Let L1 (L¯1, resp.) and U1 (U¯1, resp.) be respectively the lower and upper end-points of the support of
F1 (F¯1, resp.). Let L (L¯, resp.) and U (U¯ , resp.) be the lower and upper end-point of the support of F (·)
(F¯ , resp.) respectively. By Theorem 15 L1 < L and L¯1 < L¯. Note also from Theorem 16 that U1 = L
and U¯1 = L¯.
First, we show that L1 = L¯1. Suppose not. Without loss of generality assume that L1 < L¯1. Thus,
primary 2 does not select any price in the interval (L1, L¯1). Thus, the primary 1 will get a strictly higher
payoff at L¯1 −  for some  > 0 compared to L1. Hence, primary 1 must select prices close to L1 with
probability 0 which contradicts that L1 is the lower end-point of F1. Thus, L1 = L¯1.
By Theorem 14 L1 can not be equal to v. Thus, L1 = L¯1 < v. Thus, both L1 and L¯1 are best responses
to primary 1 and primary 2 respectively at Y . Since L1 = L¯1, thus, the expected payoff at Y must be the
same for both players. Also note that since primaries randomize between Y and N , thus, the payoffs at
Y and N must be the same. Hence, the expected payoff of the primaries at N also must be the same.
Thus, no primary can have a jump at v under N . This is because if a primary has a jump at N , then the
other primary would get a strictly higher payoff at a price just below v which contradicts that both the
primaries must have the same payoff under N . Thus, L, L¯ < v.
Now, we show that L = L¯, towards this end, we introduce few more notations. Let p¯1 − c be the
maximum expected payoff of primary 1 (2, resp.) under F1(·) (F¯1(·), resp.) and p¯2 − c be the expected
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payoff of primary 1 (2, resp.) under F (·) (F¯ (·), resp.).
Suppose L 6= L¯. Without loss of generality assume that L > L¯. Thus, L¯ < v. Since L¯ is the upper
end-point of F¯1(·) and L¯ < v, thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 at L¯ under F¯1(·) is p¯1 − c. Thus,
(L¯− c)(1− p1F1(L¯)) = p¯1 − c (158)
L¯ is also a best response of primary 2 at N , thus,
(L¯− c)(1− qp1F1(L¯)) = p¯2 − c (159)
Since v > L > L¯ and L is the upper end-point of F1(·), thus, L is also a best response of primary 1
under Y .
(L− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)F¯ (L)) = p¯1 − c (160)
Since L is the lower end point of F (·), thus, under N , the expected payoff of primary 1 at L is
(L− c)(1− qp2 − q(1− p2)F¯ (L)) = p¯2 − c (161)
Also note that since L > L¯, thus, L is in the support of F¯ (·), thus, under N , the expected payoff to
primary 2 at L is
(L− c)(1− qp1) = p¯2 − c (162)
as F1(L) = 1 and F (L) = 0.
Thus, from (162) and (161) p1 = p2 + (1− p2)F¯ (L). Now, the expected payoff of primary 2 at L when
it selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available, is
(L− c)(1− p1) = (L− c)(1− p2 − (1− p2)F¯ (L))
= p¯1 − c from(160) (163)
Hence, from (158), (163), (159) and (162) that
1− p1F1(L¯)
1− p1 =
1− qp1F1(L¯)
1− qp1 (164)
which leads to a contradiction as neither q is not equal to 1 nor F1(L¯) = 1. Hence, we must have L = L¯.
Now, at L, the expected payoff of primary 2 at Y is (L − c)(1 − p1) = p¯1 − c. Similarly, at L¯, the
expected payoff of primary 1 at Y is (L¯− c)(1− p2) = p¯1− c. Since L = L¯, thus, we must have p1 = p2.
Hence, the result follows.
Next, we determine the probability with which the primaries must randomize between Y and N in an
NE strategy.
Observation 10. If both the primaries randomize between Y and N , they should do it w.p. p where
p =
q(v − c)(1− q)− s
q(v − c)(1− q)− sq .
Proof: Suppose that a primary selects its price from F1(·) under Y and when it knows that the
channel of other primary is available. Suppose that under F1(·) the expected payoff is p˜1 − c. Thus, the
expected payoff of primary 1 under Y is
(v − c)(1− q) + q(p˜1 − c)− s (165)
Suppose that the primary selects its price from F (·) under N . Since no primary has any jump at v when
both the primaries randomize between Y and N and v is the upper end-point of F (·) by Theorem 16,
thus, the expected payoff under N is (v − c)(1 − q). Since the primary randomizes between Y and N ,
thus, the expected payoff under Y and under N must be the same. Hence, we must have s = q(p˜1 − c).
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Suppose L be the upper end point of the support of F1(·) (and thus, also the lower endpoint of F (·)).
Hence, the expected payoff at L is
(L− c)(1− qp) = (v − c)(1− q) (166)
Thus, L = (v − c)(1− q)/(1− qp) + c. Also note that L is also a best response at F1(·). Thus,
(L− c)(1− p) = s
q
(v − c)(1− q)(1− p)
1− qp =
s
q
(167)
Obtaining p from the above expression will give the desired result.
3) Does there exists an NE where one player selects Y w.p. 1?:
Theorem 18. There is no NE where a primary selects Y w.p. 1 and the other primary selects Y w.p. p
and N w.p. 1− p.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that primary 1 selects Y w.p. 1 and the primary 2 selects
Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1− p.
Now suppose that primary 1 selects a price using the distribution function F1(·) when it knows that
the channel of its competitor is available for sale. Let at Y , primary 2 selects a price using distribution
function F2(·) when it knows that the channel of its competitor is available for sale, and at N , it selects
a price using distribution function F¯2(·).
Let L1 be the lower end-point of the support of F1(·) and L2 (L¯2, resp.) be the lower end-point of
F2(·) (F¯2, resp.).
Note from Theorem 15 that L¯2 > L2. Now, we show that L1 = L2. Suppose that L1 > L2, then,
primary 2 can attain strictly higher payoff at any price close to L1 compared to at L2 which shows that
L2 can not be a lower end-point of F2. By symmetry, it also follows that L1 can not be less than L2,
hence L1 = L2. Thus, the expected payoff at Y must be equal for both the primaries.
Now, note that F1(·) can not have a jump at v by Theorem 14. Note that the upper end-point of F¯2(·) is
v by Theorem 16. Since F1(·) does not have a jump at v, thus, v is a best response of primary 2 under N .
Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 under N is (v − c)(1− q). Since primary 2 randomizes between
N and Y , thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 is (v − c)(1 − q) under Y . Thus, the expected payoff
of primary 1 is also (v − c)(1− q).
At any x ∈ [L¯2, v) primary 2 does not have any jump, thus, x is a best response for primary 1. Thus,
at any x ∈ [L¯2, v) the expected payoff of primary 1 is
(x− c)(1− p− (1− p)F¯2(x)) = p˜1 − c
F¯2(x) =
1
1− p(1− p−
1
1− p
p˜1 − c
x− c ) (168)
Note that under Y , the expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1− q) + q(p˜1 − c)− s.
Now, if primary 1 selects N and a price x ∈ [L¯2, v), then its expected payoff is
(x− c)(1− qp− q(1− p)F¯2(x))
= (x− c)(1− qp− q(1− p− p˜1 − c
x− c ))
= (x− c)(1− q) + (p˜1 − c)q (169)
Thus, for any small enough  > 0, we have (v−c−)(1−q)+(p˜1−c)q > (v−c)(1−q)(1−q)+q(p˜1−c)−s¿
Hence, primary 1 has profitable unilateral deviation. Hence, such a strategy profile can never be an NE.
Note that we have already ruled out the possibility of the NE strategy profile where a primary selects
Y w.p. 1 and the other selects either N or Y w.p. 1. Hence, there is no NE where a primary selects Y
w.p. 1.
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4) Does there exist a NE where one player selects N w.p. 1?:
Theorem 19. There is no NE where a primary selects N w.p. 1 and the other primary randomizes between
Y and N .
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that primary 1 selects N w.p. 1 and primary 2 randomizes
between Y and N .
Suppose that primary 1 selects its price using F (·). Let L be the lower end-point of the support of
F (·). Let p˜1 − c be the expected payoff of primary 1. Let primary 2 selects F2(·) when it selects Y and
it knows that the channel of primary 1 is available. Let L2 be the lower end-point of F2(·). First, note
that L1 must be equal to the L2. Since L2 < v by Theorem 16 and L1 = L2, thus, L2 is a best response
for both primary 1 and 2. The expected payoff of primary 2 under Y when the channel of primary 1 is
L2− c− s. Similarly, the expected payoff of primary 1 is L2− c. Thus, p˜1− c = L2− c. Expected payoff
of primary 2 under Y is, q(L2 − c) + (v − c)(1− q)− s.
Also let L be the lower end point of F¯2 where F¯2 be the pricing strategy that primary 2 uses when it
selects N . From Theorem 16 the upper end-point of the support of F2(·) is also L. From Theorem16 also
note that the upper end-point of F¯2(·) is v.
First, note that under N the expected payoff of primary 2 must be at least (v− c)(1− q) as this is the
payoff that primary 2 can at least get when it selects v. Now, we show that under N , the expected payoff
of primary 2 must be equal to (v − c)(1 − q). Suppose not, i.e. primary 2 attains an expected payoff of
larger than (v − c)(1 − q). Since the upper end-point of F¯2 is v, thus, primary 1 must have a jump at
v. Since primary 1 has a jump at v, thus, v is a best response for primary 1. Thus, primary 1 attains an
expected payoff of (v− c)(1− q) under N . Thus, p˜1− c = (v− c)(1− q). Since primary 2 is randomizing
between Y and N , thus, the primary 2’s expected payoff is also greater than (v−c)(1−q) when it selects
Y . Thus, if the primary 1 select Y and price L2 w.p. 1 when the channel of primary 2 is available and
v w.p. 1 otherwise; then it will also get an expected payoff of q(L2 − c) + (v − c)(1 − q) − s which is
higher compared to (v − c)(1− q). Hence, this is not possible.
Thus, the expected payoff of primary 2 must be equal to (v−c)(1−q). Since primary 1 gets an expected
payoff of at least of (v − c)(1− q), thus, L2 − c ≥ (v − c)(1− q). Since L is the upper end-point of the
support of F2(·) and L is also the lower end-point of the support of F¯2, thus,
(L− c)(1− F1(L))− s ≥ (v − c)(1− q)− s
(L− c)(1− qF1(L)) = (v − c)(1− q) (170)
both can not be true simultaneously since q 6= 1. Hence, the result follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 13
First, we show that there is no NE where each primary selects Y w.p. 1 (Theorem 20). Subsequently,
we show Theorem 13.
First, we introduce some notations:
Definition 5. Let wm,n(x) denote the probability that at least m (0 < m < n) success out of (n − 1)
events where each event has probability of success of x. Thus,
wm,n(x) =
n−1∑
i=m
(
n− 1
i
)
xi(1− x)n−1−i. (171)
We also denote
Wm,n(x) = 1− wm,n(x). (172)
wm,n(·) is strictly increasing and continuous function in the interval [0, 1]. Thus, Wm,n(·) is strictly
decreasing and continuous. Note that inverse of wm,n exists and is also increasing and continuous. Also,
note that wm,K−1 < wm,K , thus, Wm,K−1 > Wm,K .
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Theorem 20. There is no NE where each primary selects Y w.p. 1.
Assume all the players select Y , so that they know each other’s channel states. Thus, the competition
becomes similar to Bertrand Competition [34], i.e. if the number of available channels is less than or
equal to m, then each primary will set its price at v since the channel of primary will always be sold.
Otherwise, each primary will set its price at c. Now, the probability that the number of available channels
is at most m is 1− wm,n(q) = Wm,n(q). Thus, the expected payoff of a player is
(v − c)Wm,n(q) + (c− c)(1−Wm,n(q))− s = (v − c)Wm,n(q)− s. (173)
Now consider the following unilateral deviation for a primary: Primary 1 selects N and sets its price at
v w.p. 1. The channel of primary 1 will be bought at least when the number of available channels is at
most m. Since primary 1 decides not to incur the cost s, thus, its expected payoff is
(v − c)Wm,n(q) (174)
This is strictly higher than (173). Hence, the strategy profile can not be an NE.
Note that when n = 2, we obtain a similar result (Theorem 1). The above result shows that there is
no NE where each primary selects Y even when n > 2 and each primary acquires the CSI of all other
primaries.
The above theorem states that in a symmetric NE, each primary must select Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1−p
where 0 ≤ p < 1.
Note that when each primary selects N w.p. 1, then, the expected payoff is (v− c)Wm,n(q) which has
been shown in [26]. Now, we show that even when each primary randomizes between Y and N in an NE
with a positive probability, then, the expected payoff is (v − c)Wm,n(q). We assume that each primary
selects Y w.p. p 0 ≤ p < 1 and N w.p. 1 − p. Before proving the result, we introduce some notations
and state and show some results.
Note that when k < m, then in a NE a primary must select v w.p. 1 when it selects Y as its channel
will always be sold. Now, we state some structural properties of Fk(·), k ≥ m and FN . Let Uk be the
upper end-point of Fk, for k = m, . . . , n and UN be the upper end-point of FN(·).
Observation 11. UN > c
Proof: At a price less than or equal to c, a primary gets an expected payoff of at most 0. However,
at v, a primary can achieve an expected payoff of (v − c)Wm,n(q) which is strictly positive. Hence, a
primary will select any price less than or equal to c with 0 probability. Hence, UN > c.
Next result shows that Fj(·), j ≥ m and FN can not have any jump except at v.
Observation 12. Fj(·) where j ≥ m, and FN(·) can not have a jump at any point except c.
Proof: We show the above result for Fj(·) where j ∈ {m, . . . , n}. The proof for FN(·) will be the
same.
Suppose not i.e. Fj(·) has a jump at x > c. However, j ≥ m, hence, the channel of all primaries will
not be bought when everyone selects x. Thus, a primary can select a price slightly below x (as x > c)
which can greatly increase the probability of winning. Hence, a primary can attain a strictly higher payoff
by selecting a price x −  for small enough  > 0 which contradicts the fact that x is a best response.
Hence, the result follows.
Suppose that a primary selects Y and j number of channels are available among the rest where j ≥ m.
Then, the above result shows that if the primary selects x > c, then its expected payoff is
(x− c)Wm,j(pFj(x) + (1− p)FN(x)) (175)
Let Umax = maxUk for k ≥ m.
Lemma 6. UN > Umax.
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Proof: Note that if Umax = c, then the result is trivially true.
Thus, we consider the case where Umax > c. Suppose that it is not true. Without loss of generality,
we assume that Umax = Uj , for some j ≥ m. Now, when j number of channels are available, then the
expected payoff at Uj (from (175) is thus,
(Uj − c)Wm,j(pFj(Uj) + (1− p)FN(Uj)) = 0 (176)
Since Fj(Uj) = 1 and FN(Uj) = 1 as the upper end-point of FN(·) is less than that of Fj(·). Since
Uj > c, thus, no primary has a jump at Uj . Hence, Uj is a best response for the primary when j number
of competitors is available.
Now, suppose that primary selects any other price y ∈ (c, UN ], the expected payoff of the primary is
(y − c)Wm,j(pFj(y) + (1− p)FN(y)) (177)
Since y > c and y ≤ UN , thus, at least Fj(y) < 1. Hence, the above expression is strictly positive. Hence,
Uj can not be a best response for the primary which contradicts that Uj is the upper end-point of Fj(·).
Thus, we reach to a contradiction. Hence, the result follows.
Lemma 7. UN = v.
Proof: Suppose not i.e. UN < v. Since Umax < UN , thus, the expected payoff at UN is
(UN − c)Wm,n(q) (178)
as if a primary selects the price UN , it will be only sold if less than m number of competitors’ channels
are available. Note that UN > c, thus, no primary does not have any jump at UN . Hence, UN is a best
response under N for a primary.
However, at any price in the interval x ∈ (UN , v), the expected payoff is
(y − c)Wm,n(q) (179)
Thus, the expected payoff is strictly higher at y. Hence, it contradicts the fact that UN is a best response
when a primary selects N . Hence, the result follows.
Now we are ready to show Theorem 13.
Proof : Lemma 7 shows that UN = v. On the other hand no primary has a jump at v as v > c. Thus,
v is a best response when a primary selects N . However, the expected payoff of the primary when it
selects N at v is (v − c)Wm,n(q). Now, when a primary randomizes between Y and N , the expected
payoff under N must be equal to the expected payoff under Y . Hence, the expected payoff of a primary
is (v− c)Wm,n(q) when a primary randomizes between Y and N . Note that if both the players select N ,
then the expected payoff of each primary is also (v − c)Wm,n(q).
